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Abstract 
The protection of shipping does not come without hazards and threats for military 
forces, individual civilian ship operators and crews. With particular focus on security 
threats, this thesis is about how to prepare for such operations without introducing 
unnecessary risks, i.e., supporting conscious risk-taking related to ship security. It 
examines both civilian and military aspects of maritime security and therefore draws 
from the experience of both fields. 
Maritime safety regulations, guidelines and methods have a history and culture of 
systematic research, development and implementation. In contrast, international 
security is highly politicised and therefore less transparent. Unfortunately, 
comprehensive studies of ship security risk are rare. Moreover, applying risk-based 
approaches to security areas requires special considerations, and the limited research 
in this field has led to a knowledge gap. 
To reduce the identified challenges with respect to security risk analysis, the goal of 
this thesis is to improve security decision support by defining an approach to ship 
security analysis. To increase overall safety, this approach must facilitate compromises 
between traditional maritime safety and maritime security. Accordingly, the objective 
is to develop an approach that is both systematic and gives the decision maker an 
appropriate picture of the security risks. To examine the requirements for a security 
decision-support approach, the work in the appended papers studies both threats to 
naval vessels and the security threat posed to commercial vessels by pirates. The results 
of the studies can be used to further develop military doctrines and civilian guidelines. 
This study shows that the description and quantification of the (concept of) operation 
in the risk analysis is central for implementing both security and naval ship 
survivability. In addition, the crew’s risk perception, procedural safeguards and how 
the implemented risk controls are perceived have an important role not only in risk 
analysis but also in deciding the effectiveness of implemented controls. It is also 
concluded that only using expected values—not collecting and using uncertainties—in 
the analysis can lead to misleading results. Therefore, the uncertainty treatment 
offered by a quantitative approach is crucial for risk understanding, especially if the 
aim is to find robust control options or to support the development of a resilient 
culture.  
Keywords: naval ship, piracy, risk-based, risk control options, ship security analysis, 
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Sedens Anatis s.l. 
 
 
Belongs to the family of things and is characterized by its helplessness and 
low level of protection. Can be found at sea, on land and in the air.  
Evolution/history: the Sitting duck (Sedens Anatis) was first found in, and 
is still common in, the Anatidae (duck) family of birds. Therefore, the 
traditional Sitting duck is characterized by it being an easy target floating 
on the water, not suspecting that it is the object of a hunter or predator. 
During the last centuries there have been many reports of Sitting ducks in 
other forms, including artefacts, humans and other types of animals. Sitting 
duck at large is therefore today considered as a family of things and 
formally named Sedens Anatis Sensu Lato (s.l.). 
- 
No one want to be onboard a sitting duck, and no one want to create one 
with poor design or poor operational decisions. To help in avoiding such 






Central concepts, organizations and abbreviations 
Below concepts, organizations and abbreviations are describes as they are defined and 
used in this thesis. 
ALARP-region: As Low as Reasonable 
Practicable region. Here discussed in rela-
tion to IMO codes. In the ALARP-region 
the risk, according to IMO, should be 
weighed against cost for implementation of 
control options. 
Aleatory uncertainty: a stochastic uncer-
tainty that describes randomness and that 
can be captured with frequencies. 
Antagonistic threat: A threat with the spe-
cific intent to harm or disturb in order to 
achieve own goals. 
Asymmetric conflict: A conflict where the 
two sides has different approaches, methods 
and/ or resources to achieve their goal. 
Bayesian network: An influence diagram 
without decision and utility nodes. 
Bayesian probability: A quantity that is 
assign for the purpose of representing a 
state of knowledge, or a state of belief. 
BMP4: The 2011 version of Best Manage-
ment Practices for protection against Soma-
lia based piracy, an influential industry 
guideline. 
Bureaucratic safety culture: An evolution 
level of the safety culture defined by a quan-
titative perspective and that ‘the system’ 
solves the safety problems. 
Case: Here used as a description of incident, 
past or future. 
Causality: A cause and effect description of 
events. Here used within cases or scenarios, 
but not to define how the future will enfold. 
Concept of operation: A description of how 
the ship is intended to be used to solve 
tasks. 
Consequence: A negative outcome of an 
incident. Can be measured with easily quan-
tifiable aspects such as cost (in dollars) or 
number of deaths, but also by more qualita-
tive operational aspects such as reaching a 
critical state (e.g. ship taken over by pi-
rates). 
Control option: A measure that reduces or 
controls risk. 
COPD: Comprehensive Operations Plan-
ning Directive, NATO’s framework for 
collaborative operations planning. 
Cope: Coping is a part of the stress process 
(within a resilient approach) and usually 
involves both task and emotion focused 
coping strategies. 
Deterministic: Describing that a process, or 
chain of events, is fully described by its prior 
state. 
Decision maker: The person that in the risk 
evaluation (based on the risk analysis) 
makes the necessary risk decisions. Decision 
makers come in many forms and roles. 
Design decision: Here used to describe all 
decisions taken about the design of the ship. 
Epistemic uncertainty: Knowledge-based 
uncertainty that represents a lack of 
knowledge regarding how a phenomenon 
affects the output of a process. 
F-N diagram: Frequency – Number of fa-
talities diagram. A cumulative diagram of-
ten used within IMO to present risk esti-
mates. 
Force protection: Preventive measures 
taken to mitigate hostile actions against 
military personnel, resources, facilities and 
critical information. 
FSA: Formal Safety Assessment, IMO’s 
risk-based approach to rule-making. 
Generative safety culture: The highest evo-
lution level of the safety culture defined by 
that safety is integrated in all tasks and un-
derstood by individuals and the organiza-
tion.  
Global commons: The areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction that connects the interna-
tional system. 
Hazard: An aspect (without intent) that 
potentially can threaten operational values 
such as human life, health, property or free-
dom of action. 
IACS: International Association of Class 
Societies, influential on how safety should 
be achieved with the use of class standards. 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device. 
IMO: International Maritime Organization, 
formally and informally defining the limits 
for maritime safety and how is achieved. 
Incident: A set of events that potentially 
can lead to negative consequences, past or 
future. 
 xiv 
Influence diagram: A graphical and math-
ematical representation of the network of 
influences derived from decision analysis. 
Inherently safe design: A safety principle 
which means that potential hazards or 
threats are excluded from the intended op-
eration. 
ISPS: International Ship and Port Security 
code introduced 2002 by IMO as a part of 
SOLAS. The first international code on 
maritime security. 
Killability: The inability of a ship to survive 
an attack, the opposite of survivability. 
Littoral: The part of a sea or ocean that is 
close to the shore. 
Military operation: Coordinated military 
actions. Operations may be of a combat or 
non-combat nature and are performed both 
in peace and in war. 
MNE 7: A multinational concept develop-
ment and experimentation project focusing 
on access to the global commons. Initiated 
by the U.S. Joint Forces Command with 
seventeen countries, from America, Europe 
and Asia, plus NATO. 
NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, here important as a developer of 
military standards and guidelines. 
Naval ship: A ship operated for military 
purpose by a naval organisation. Here used 
as synonym to war ship and military ship. 
NSC: The Naval Ship Code, a naval safety 
code developed by NATO and harmonized 
to SOLAS. 
OPV: Offshore Patrol Vessel, a type of 
military ship with offshore capability de-
signed for flexibility and engaged in roles 
such as border protection and rescue opera-
tions. 
Prescriptive: Typically used to describe 
codes and rules that prescribe aspects of 
design or construction with engineering 
specifications. 
Probabilistic: A description based on 
events likeliness (probability). 
Procedural safeguards: A safety principle 
which is introduced via procedures and 
training. 
Recoverability: The ability of the system 
and its personnel to sustain operational 
capability after hit. 
Resilience: An organization’s capacity to 
anticipate disruptions and adapt to events. 
Risk: The potential loss of something of 
value, defined by its probability and conse-
quence. 
Risk analysis: An analysis of risk including 
scenario definition, hazard identification 
and risk estimation. 
Risk assessment: A risk evaluation include-
ing a risk analysis, risk tolerability decisions 
and analysis of options. 
Risk-based (ship) design: A concept for 
risk-based approaches that can be used 
throughout a ship design. Discussed and 
described within SAFEDOR, a project un-
der the 6th framework programme of the 
European Commission 
Risk management: A management process 
including risk assessment, reduction and 
control, implementation and monitoring. 
Robustness: The ability to withstand sur-
prises, changes and disturbances. 
RPG: Originally a Russian abbreviation for 
Ruchnaya Protivotankovaya Granata, 
meaning hand-held anti-tank grenade. RPG 
is a common weapon used in many situa-
tions. 
Safe fail: A safety principle which is imple-
mented such that if systems fails, it does so 
safely. 
Safety: The quality achieved when the di-
rect and indirect participants of an activity 
as well the goals of the activity are sufficient 
protected against hazards and threats. 
Safety culture: A culture that understands 
and effectively deals with hazards (safety 
challenges) and threats (security chal-
lenges). The culture can be described by its 
levels of maturity or evolution: (i) patho-
logical, (ii) reactive, (iii) bureaucratic, (iv) 
proactive, and (v) generative. 
Safety reserves: A safety principle intro-
duced with safety factors or safety margins. 
Scenario: A description of a future. 
Security: A sub-set of safety, which deals 
with protection against threats (with an 
intent). 
Ship design: The term ship design here in-
cludes the process of defining all the physi-
cal aspects such as structural aspects of the 
hull, human factors, the specifications of 
installed equipment and the infrared aspects 
of the paint. 
Skiff: Here used to describe a small boat 
used by pirates to attack ships. 
 xv 
Socio-technical systems: The family of sys-
tems studied here which include technology, 
but also interaction between people and 
technology. 
SOLAS: The Safety of Life at Sea regula-
tion developed by IMO. “War ships” are ex-
cluded. 
Survivability: In this thesis only discussed 
in relation to naval ships and is then the 
ability to survive an attack, described by 
susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverabil-
ity. 
Susceptibility: The inability (including tac-
tical measures) to avoid hit, governs the 
probability of a hit. 
Threat: A person or organisation (with 
intent) that potentially can threaten opera-
tional values such as human life, health, 
property or freedom of action. 
Tactical Task: A tasks performed by a mili-
tary unit (such as a ship) that enables a mis-
sion or function to be accomplished. 
Traditional maritime safety: Here used to 
describe safety work only in relation to haz-
ards, i.e. relative complement of security in 
safety (safety ∖ security). 
Vulnerability: The inability to resist dam-
age, governs the probability of kill (or dam-






“On November 25, 2005, an attack in Afghanistan occurred which led to the 
death of two Swedish soldiers. This tragic event led to a review of the 
Afghanistan initiative from many perspectives. Among other things came to 
light that there were different assessments of threats, vulnerabilities and risks 
at various levels in the Armed Forces. The concept flora and responsibilities 
was unclear and there was a lack of consensus in several fields. Despite that, 
the knowledge of the threats in theatre and vulnerabilities in many respects 
was good; there were difficulties in translating this knowledge into concrete 
measures. There was a lack of a holistic approach to risk. There was no 
conscious risk-taking.” 
The Swedish Supreme Commander in the introduction to The Swedish 
Armed Forces shared risk management model (Swedish Armed Forces 
2009a). 
1 Introduction 
Both state and non-state actors pose a potential threat to the global commons through 
criminal intent, opposition to existing norms and other anti-access approaches 
(Secretary of Defense 2012). The protection of shipping does not come without 
hazards and threats to military forces, individual ship operators and crews (Council of 
the European Union 2014). With particular focus on security threats, this thesis is 
about how to prepare for such operations without introducing unnecessary risks, i.e., 
supporting conscious risk-taking related to ship security. 
To enable economic stability and commerce, it is necessary to protect the free flow of 
goods shipped by sea(Council of the European Union 2014). The sea largely includes 
the areas beyond national waters, i.e., the global commons (Secretary of Defense 2012; 
MNE 7 2012). The shipping system is composed of many autonomous actors ranging 
from small local ship owners to large international ship operators that do not own their 
own ships. Additionally, from Sweden’s national perspective compared to that of other 
European countries, the geographic situation makes the country especially dependent 
on sea transport (Swedish Maritime Administration 2013). Therefore, in general 
maritime security has both military and civilian implications and all ships must consider 
their specific security situations. 
In this work, safety is defined as a quality that is achieved when an activity’s direct 
and indirect participants, together with its goals, are sufficiently protected against 
hazards and threats. Security is a subset of safety and addresses protection against 
antagonistic threats. 
In the field of transport, according to this definition, safety is achieved when categories 
such as the following are sufficiently protected against accidents and attacks: 
 the personnel performing the transport, such as the seafarer, 
 other persons along the transport route, such as the workers at the warehouse, 
other seafarers and communities along the route, and 
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 the transport itself, i.e., both the cargo and the timeliness of the delivery. 
How to define sufficiently protected is decided by society and is usually based on both 
statistics and perception. Security is achieved when all three of the abovementioned 
categories are protected against attacks. However, it is not necessary that the same 
definitions for sufficiently protected can be used. 
Therefore safety in general here refers to the total situation including all dangers 
(hazards and threats). This because many ship safety measures are applicable to both 
traditional maritime safety and maritime security. For example the damage stability 
depends on the extent of the damage, not who or why it happened and a life raft is 
useful no matter why you have to abandon the ship. To describe safety work only in 
relation to hazards this thesis uses the term traditional maritime safety. It is also 
important to note that even though security analysis examines incidents triggered by a 
threat a security analysis cannot ignore the hazards. This because the particular 
combination of threats and hazards is what make the situation challenging (for 
example security incidents in shallow waters or in bad weather). 
Security and maritime security are addressed by both military and civilian 
organisations and often, a security decision made by one will affect the other (Council 
of the European Union 2014). Therefore, this thesis cannot limit itself to either 
military or civilian ship security and the purpose of this project has been to combine 
civilian and military knowledge and research. This purpose is also supported by the 
European Union maritime strategy that calls for a cross-sectoral approach (and 
including both civilian and military actors) as the first guiding principle of the strategy 
(Council of the European Union 2014). Experience and research from both areas are 
discussed and used; however, in this thesis the focus is on military ship security. 
1.1 Background 
In military operations, casualties—whether deliberate or accidental—are a reality and 
the desire to avoid them may drastically affect the possibilities of achieving military 
goals. However, in the asymmetric conflicts of today there is a drive for high efficiency 
and low losses. This leads to a focus on survivability in military organisations. With 
respect to survivability, a balance of risk is required and a comprehensive risk 
assessment process is essential to guide risk management decision-making and 
prioritisation (NATO 2007, 2010a). However, this is not easily achieved, as exemplified 
in the Swedish Supreme Commander’s statement set forth above. 
Risk is an important aspect of understanding the operational situation (NATO 2010a). 
However, in guidelines such as The Naval Ship Code (NSC) (NATO 2010b) and 
Survivability of Small Warships and Auxiliary Naval Vessels (NATO 2012), ship safety 
and ship survivability goals are discussed without introducing methods and tools for 
supporting design decisions. Therefore, the design process needs an integrated 
approach to security decisions for assessing the survivability and safety for naval ships. 
The approach should be probabilistic to connect to military survivability theory and to 
the risk-based framework of military planning and force protection. 
For civilian ships, today’s threats are managed through maritime security efforts 
regulated in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code (IMO 2002). 
The ISPS code was developed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
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attacks in the United States. The development began two months after the attacks and 
the final code was presented 13 months later (Wengelin 2012). The speed of this 
process implies that its development was characterised by the preferability of having 
something imperfect to having nothing at all (Mitropoulos 2004). However, according 
to ship operators and security experts, the guideline is inadequate to guarantee secure 
shipping. Moreover, when ship operators’ ship security analysis is challenged, they 
have been shown to have problems defending its quality.  
The ship operator “is responsible for identifying the risks associated with its particular 
ships, operations and trade”. It is inadequately merely to comply with codes and 
regulations; these can only be seen as a starting point (IACS 2012). Therefore, both 
military and civilian ship operators must work to structure ship security, an area that 
needs further development (Liwång et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2013; Bichou 2008). 
1.2 Motivation and objective  
Control, efficiency and cost demands on maritime operations are high. In addition, 
there are increasing levels of conflict in highly populated coastal areas. In these areas, 
there are busy sea lanes and the conflicts place new security demands on both civilian 
and military maritime operations (Department of Defense 2007; Council of the 
European Union 2014). 
The risk control options to achieve both security and survivability for naval ships are 
aspects that often are connected to central aspects of the ship design, such as damage 
stability and system redundancy. When the basic design is set, the possibility of 
changing the ship’s security measures is limited. There is, therefore, a need to assess 
the level of security to which different concepts lead at early stages of the ship design 
to provide input into the decision process with respect to risk control options. Such an 
assessment is especially challenging when new threats are envisioned and older ships’ 
survivability design is not a relevant benchmark. 
Risk is not constant and is subject to considerable degrees of uncertainty. The rarer the 
event, if predictable at all, the less reliable the historical data and the estimates based 
on them (IACS 2012). To enable the results of an analysis to reflect both uncertainty 
and the possibility of surprise, there is a need for a risk-informed approach that goes 
beyond calculated probabilities and expected values (Aven 2009). Uncertainties and 
possible surprises must be considered a relevant part of the risk picture, which provides 
for rational input into the decision-making process (Aven 2009) and increases a study’s 
credibility (Kunreuther 2002). 
Regulations, guidelines and methods in the field of maritime safety have a history and 
culture of systematic research, development and implementation (Kuo 2007). In 
contrast, international security is highly politicised and therefore not as transparent 
(Wengelin 2012). The result is that the tradition of ship security is not well established 
(McNaught 2005). One example is the ISPS code, which “as it stands, may not be the 
final solution to this problem” (Mitropoulos 2004). 
Unfortunately, comprehensive studies on ship security risk are rare (Yang 2011; 
Bichou 2008; Paper III), and systematic handling of uncertainties, which is necessary to 
create rational input into the decision-making process, is even rarer. Applying risk-
based approaches to security areas requires special considerations, and the limited 
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research to date has led to a knowledge gap (Yang 2011). Therefore, there is a need for 
both further research and the applied development of methods and tools. This 
development must be able to manage the new, more complex demands for both 
civilian and naval ship security (Department of Defense 2007; McNaught 2005). 
Examples of ship security challenges include reports of fast (~25 knots) and well-
operated ships choosing to stop because of shots from pirates (IMB 2011), even though 
both best practises and a rudimentary risk analysis show that maintaining or increasing 
speed is always the safest alternative, especially at high speeds. Another example is the 
improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a Swedish military vehicle in Afghanistan 
on November 25, 2005. Before the incident, different levels of the organisation made 
different assessments of its threats, vulnerabilities and risks. This was in part a result of 
difficulties in communicating different security focuses—i.e., personal security versus 
operational security. A third example of challenges in security analysis is the US 
President’s receipt of a range of probability estimates—from 30 to 95 percent—of the 
probability that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan (Friedman and 
Zeckhauser 2014). This range of probability cannot be ignored, but the President was 
openly frustrated by its existence (Friedman and Zeckhauser 2014). These three 
examples show that security decisions—and especially, transforming knowledge about 
the threat to suitable decisions and communicating those decisions—are a challenge, 
even in otherwise well-functioning organisations. 
To reduce the above-identified challenges, the goal of this thesis is to improve support 
for the security decision by defining an approach to ship security analysis to enhance 
the risk management. To increase overall safety, the approach must facilitate 
compromises between traditional maritime safety and maritime security. The objective 
is thus to develop an approach that is systematic and ensures that the ship operator’s 
decision support gives the decision maker an appropriate picture of the risks. This 
approach may not only be used for an unpredictable future but also describe and 
model the relationships from threat to risk. 
The overarching research question for this thesis is therefore as follows: 
What characterises a decision-support approach that increases ship security by 
translating knowledge into a suitable description of the risks and promotes a 
conscious risk-taking? 
To examine the requirements from a security decision-support approach for ship 
operators’ knowledge development, the work in Papers I to V combines civilian and 
military knowledge and research and studies ship operations with threats additional to 
the typical safety hazards. Such threats include but are not limited to a military threat 
to naval vessels (Papers I, II, IV and V) and the security threat posed by pirates to 
commercial vessels (Paper III). Before and during such operations, the ship designer, 
commander and crew must consider the security threat when reaching compromises in 
design or operation. 
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“Think of your entire operation and the range of all potential problems as a 
mountain range. 
Looking at the entire scope of your operation, you may only be able to 
focus on the highest of peaks within your available time frame. 
However, if you choose a specific aspect of your operation (e.g., cargo 
loading) you can examine it in greater depth and detail. This approach is 
more effective for targeting specific problems.” 
Marine Operations Risk Guide (U.S. Coast Guard n.d.). 
2 Methodology 
This thesis is composed of five different studies, all of which combined civilian and 
military research; required different methods; and examined the research question 
from different scientific perspectives. The order of the studies was chosen to gradually 
increase the complexity of the research object, from the conditions for implementing 
security and military survivability as defined by safety guidelines (Paper I) to the 
conditions for a fully risk-based approach to ship military survivability (Paper V). To 
support this progression, as illustrated in Figure 1, the result of each paper is used as a 
knowledge and method base for the next. 
 
Figure 1. Work performed and the development of a knowledge base for ship security research. 
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This thesis is about the conditions for a top-level assessment approach; such an 
approach requires the input of methods, tools, data and models on lower levels. To 
include the depth and detail needed, the work is divided into studies that each have a 
different focus on specific aspects of the examined top-level approach. Therefore, the 
five appended papers cover different aspects, all chosen so that together, they examine 
the top-level assessment. In Papers I through V, the methodical choices, approaches 
and considerations for each study are discussed in more detail. 
Common to all six application areas studied—supplementary ballistic protection in 
Paper I; bridge design for small arms protection in Paper I; a naval operation under a 
mine threat in Paper II; piracy attacks on merchant shipping in Paper III; an 
asymmetric threat to a generic Ocean Patrol Vessel in Paper IV; and fire survivability 
analysis in Paper V—is that each represents a maritime security area: 
 where the threat is defined as important for both contemporary and future 
maritime operations (Department of Defense 2007; King 2013; IMB 1993-2014; 
McGeorge and Høyning 2002), 
 where today’s analyses are, whether by practise or by guidelines, described as 
risk-based (IACS 2012; NATO 2010a; Swedish Armed Forces 2009a), and 
 for which there exists only limited research on the conditions for risk-based 
approaches (for further detail, see Table 1 and Paper III, along with Bichou 
(2008)). 
The focus in Papers I and II is to examine the problem. The application areas are 
deliberately limited and simplified: 
Paper I, Minimising risk from armed attacks: the effects of the NATO Naval Ship 
Code, examines a NATO framework for traditional maritime safety efforts on 
naval ships and analyses what is needed to create relevant conditions for 
survivability analysis in the design phase. The framework is analysed in relation 
to how it affects supplementary ballistic protection and bridge design for small 
arms protection. 
Paper II, Probabilistic risk assessment for integrating survivability and safety measures 
on naval ships, discusses, based on the result of Paper I, the possibility of using a 
probabilistic approach and risk as the measure for introducing a quantitative 
rationale to use when comparing ship design choices (such as sensor 
characteristics and watch scheme). The suggested approach is discussed in 
relation to a simplified example of a naval operation under a mine threat. 
Papers III through V each not only cover a specific field but also examine relevant 
methods and methodical aspects based on the findings in Papers I and II. In Papers III 
to V, the chosen application areas require a more complex background description: 
Paper III, Quantitative risk analysis—ship security analysis for effective risk control 
options, deepens the examination of risk as measure with the particular focus on 
collection of expert data and on quantitative modelling. The analysis is 
performed on a civilian scenario: piracy attacks on merchant shipping (one of the 
models developed is examined more closely in Liwång and Ringsberg (2013)). 
The civilian scenario was chosen so that specific threat and scenario data 
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collection and analysis could be performed without disclosing confidential 
information. It was also important to study a scenario for which there exist 
official incident statistics and experts with first-hand knowledge in the area. 
Paper IV, Analysis of control options for the survivability of Ocean Patrol Vessels, 
deepens the examination of risk as a measure with a particular focus on the 
analysis and treatment of uncertainties. Uncertainties in input and output are 
studied and discussed with respect to an asymmetric threat to a generic Ocean 
Patrol Vessel (OPV). The application area is chosen to represent an area in 
which there is an acute need for decisions and the uncertainties are substantial, 
i.e., in which decisions are generally made despite uncertainties. The focus is on 
typical values and typical uncertainties, not the specific probabilities for a specific 
ship. 
Paper V, Conditions for risk based ship survivability approach: a study on the analysis 
of fire risk, examines the conditions for risk-based survivability design from 
design concept to operational risk. The study is limited to fire survivability 
analysis and discusses risk with the help of a quantified littoral scenario. Fire on 
naval ships is discussed in relation to several threat types. The application area is 
chosen because fire is one of the consequences of almost all types of attacks and 
because it is a well-researched area for civilian ships in general and in relation to 
risk-based ship design. There are also some statistics on fire on naval ships, along 
with scientific documentation with respect to incidents and fire protection. Paper 
V examines the risk-analysis process and discusses its approach with respect to 
risk level, not the specific risk for a specific ship. 
Risk-based approaches are therefore examined from several different perspectives. 
Papers I and V examine specific ship protection areas and Papers II, III and IV 
examine specific tactical situations/scenarios. 
2.1 General approach and assumptions 
This work is primarily about creating decision support. A quantitative approach to 
security requires a suitable measure. The concept of risk is the candidate that is well 
established in both military operations and maritime safety analysis (see Paper II and 
Liwång et al. (2014) for further discussion of how the concept of risk is used in military 
operations). Therefore, in this work risk is the central measure of security—a tool to 
use—not the research object. The research objects are methods for decision support 
that aim to support a high level of security in military operations. 
Security cannot be grasped within a single academic discipline. Therefore, the work in 
this thesis is interdisciplinary. The research must cross traditional boundaries between 
academic disciplines and schools of thought. This is, as stated in Section 1, also a 
specific purpose of this project. Compared to traditional engineering research there is, 
as a result of the interdisciplinary nature of the research, a greater need to define the 
scientific assumptions on which the research is based, especially with respect to the 
type of systems studied, the concept of risk and uncertainties in the analysis. 
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2.1.1 Characteristics of the examined system and the role of safety culture 
The physical and non-physical attributes studied in this work are seen as a system with 
several interdependencies. Figure 2 presents a basic scheme for different types of 
systems: a general level and a sub-level of system families. This thesis focuses on 
systems within the socio-technological system family, i.e., systems that include not only 
technology but also people and aspects such as organisations, policies and social 
structures. 
  
Figure 2. System levels and system families, redrawn from Ingelstam (2012). The focus system 
family for this thesis is highlighted in bold text. 
The systems are studied in a probabilistic setting, which means that the studied 
incidents are not specific events but instead, are types of events in a possible future. 
Probabilistic causality is used within studied scenarios, systems and cases (to model 
how actions relate to each other), but causality is not used to define the future. 
This thesis applies the system perspective, which shares its perspective with system 
science and approaches such as systems engineering, operational analysis and human-
machine interaction. Thus, the focus is on the system’s behaviour, not on the system 
itself.  
Both the socio-technological systems studied and the focus on system behaviour lead 
to the conclusion that culture is an important aspect of a system. Therefore, in this 
work, an effective analysis (and usefulness) is defined by an approach that supports the 
development of a safety culture as defined by Section 3. It is also this usefulness of the 
approach that defines the validity of the approach (Pedersen et al. 2000). There is also 
a strong connection between the type of system studied, the acknowledgement of the 
importance of culture and the fact that security is often implemented based on safe fail 
and procedural safeguards as discussed in Section 5.1.1. 
2.1.2 Risk and risk analysis 
This work is further based on the notion that development in the area of ship security 
would benefit if it was consistent with the approaches utilised in maritime safety. Such 
consistency would then allow safety risks to be compared with security risks to find the 
best compromise. For further details, see Papers I and II. In this work, these 
assumptions lead to the use of risk as the central measure of ship security. 
Here, risk management is defined as the systematic application of management 
policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of analysing, evaluating and controlling 
risk. Risk management is often defined by the following activities (Bakx and 
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Richardson 2013; DCDC 2010; Kuo 2007; NATO 2010a; Department of the Army 
2006): 
A. A risk analysis including scope or scenario definition, hazard and threat 
identification and risk estimation. 
B. A risk evaluation including risk tolerability decisions and analysis of options. 
C. Risk reduction and control including decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring. 
Risk assessment is defined as consisting of steps A and B from the list above. See 
Figure 3 for an illustration of typical military risk management and its components and 
sub-components. Here, risk or risk level is defined as a function of the probability and 
the consequence of an unexpected/unwanted event. 
 
Figure 3. The security risk management process and its components. This thesis’s areas of focus, 
as described in Section 2.2, are highlighted in bold text. Developed from Department of the 
Army (2006) and Marine Corps Institute (2002). 
The traditional engineering approach to the measure risk and the process risk analysis, 
as described in Section 4, is based on objectivistic expected utility, which combines 
frequentistic (objective) probabilities with objectivistic utilities. This means that 
probability is interpreted as an objective representation of frequency and that there is 
a linear relationship between the consequences studied and their perceived negative 
effects, i.e., the utility assignments (Hansson, 1993). According to Hansson’s research 
on the philosophy of risk, this can only be the case if the following five criteria are 
satisfied: 
1. The decisions options, as well as the system studied, must be both finite and defined 
Real systems and options are never finite. Papers I through V stress that the system 
and scenarios must be defined and documented and that their definitions must be 
easily understood throughout the risk management process. See, for example, the 
discussion on safety culture in relation to risk analysis in Papers I and II and the 
operations scenarios definition in Paper V. 
2. The analysis must be able to identify the negative outcomes of the studied hazard 
Difficulties in defining consequences must be documented, especially with respect to 
the perception of security, and these difficulties must be thoroughly weighed in risk 
tolerability decisions, analyses of options and risk reduction. For further discussion of 
risk perception see Paper III, Kunreuther (2002), and Liwång et al. (2014). Moreover, 
Paper V and Liwång et al. (2015) discuss the assessment of different types of 
consequences. 
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3. The analysis must enable an objective description of the consequences of the hazard 
The decision maker, not the analyst, has the responsibility of weighing different 
consequences against each other, and this work focuses on the ability to disclose and 
document both causal relationships and uncertainties from threat to risk under the 
assumption that such an understanding facilitates both risk tolerability decisions and 
risk reduction. For further detail, see the discussions on safety culture in Papers I and 
II and uncertainties in Paper IV. 
4. It must be possible to obtain/assess the probabilities with reasonable accuracy 
It is necessary to document and highlight in the process how the probabilities have 
been obtained, the reported actual frequencies or the expert assessment, together with 
uncertainties. Those uncertainties must then be considered in the decision process; see, 
e.g., the discussion of safety factors in Paper II, the discussion of robust solutions in 
Paper III and the analysis of uncertainties in Paper IV. 
5. It must be rational to keep the expected outcome (i.e., the probability times the 
consequence) as low as possible 
For comparison between frequently occurring cases, it makes sense to keep the 
expected outcome to a minimum; however, this is not always valid in case-by-case 
comparisons for hazards or threats with low probability or with very different 
probabilities. Therefore the criteria has limited validity to security analysis; see for 
example the discussion on measures of effectiveness in Papers I and II (weighing risk 
against gain), the discussion on robust solutions in Paper III and the discussion of 
possible conflicts among different consequences in Paper V. 
Summarising the discussion on the five criteria above, it can be found that the risk 
perspective in this thesis is based on the following assumptions: 
 objectivistic expected utility can serve as a base for describing security risks for 
ships, and 
 the result of the analysis can give a reasonable representation of the risk. 
The first assumption set forth above means that probabilities and consequences 
obtained by the analysis are assumed to objectively describe the negative outcomes of 
the threat. 
According to the second assumption above, therefore, the result can only be seen as a 
simplified description of the risk. However, based on the discussion above, the result of 
a risk analysis is assumed to give a reasonable representation of the risk. This is 
particularly true if the analysis maintains a focus on communicating and continuously 
updating throughout the organisation the principles for system definition, 
methodological understanding, relevant system understanding and well-defined risk 
acceptance criteria. Risk reduction and control must focus on all levels of the 
organisation in risk reduction implementation, they must focus on a continuous and 
broad awareness when monitoring the different activities, and they must focus on 
adapting countermeasures accordingly during voyages (Liwång et al. 2014; Liwång et 
al. 2015). 
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2.1.3 The decision maker 
As described in Figure 3, risk analysis supports the risk evaluation in which the 
decision maker makes the necessary risk decisions. Such decision makers come in 
many forms and play many roles. 
The decision makers involved in the selection of ballistic protection and bridge design 
(Paper I) and fire survivability design (Paper V) are typically found within naval ship 
design projects—for example, in naval administrations—and play roles in ship design. 
However, risk in an operation under either a mine threat (Paper II) or an asymmetric 
threat (Paper IV) affects not only design decisions within naval administrations but 
also operational decision makers onboard. Civilian ship security decisions, such as how 
to decrease piracy risks (Paper III), are made within a ship operator’s onshore 
organisation with respect to, for example, cargo, routes and general protective 
measures, and onboard with respect to implementing specific protective measures and 
executing protective actions. This thesis addresses the types of analysis needed for the 
above-mentioned types of decision but does not explicitly study the decision makers 
and their decisions. 
2.1.4 Uncertainties in security analysis 
In the early stages (project initiation, planning, analysis and alternative generation) of 
a ship development project, the need to understand the intended system and its 
limitations is crucial (Giachetti 2010). However, there are substantial uncertainties, 
and understanding those uncertainties is a part of understanding the system. 
Therefore, to manage risk as more than merely expected values, this thesis discusses 
both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties where: 
 aleatory uncertainty is defined as a stochastic uncertainty that describes 
randomness and that can, given a perfect controllable and probabilistic world, be 
captured with frequencies; typical variables that often are probabilistically 
modeled include the wave height on an ocean or the fail frequency for a pump, 
and 
 epistemic uncertainty is defined as a knowledge-based uncertainty that represents 
a lack of knowledge regarding how a phenomenon affects the output of a process, 
such as how an antagonistic threat will act in a specific situation. In this work, 
epistemic uncertainty is conceptualised as the difference in estimates and beliefs 
among different experts. 
Aleatory uncertainty can be treated with frequentistic classical risk-analysis methods 
and is automatically included in a probabilistic risk-based approach. However, 
epistemic uncertainty can be approached only through Bayesian probability and expert 
opinions (Paté-Cornell 1996). In this thesis, epistemic uncertainty is defined as expert 
disagreement (see Paper III for examples of how epistemic parameter uncertainty can 
be quantified as the result of expert disagreement). 
Epistemic uncertainty is particularly substantial for security analysis: “an event 
occurring on the other side of the earth could quickly change the risk assessment” (Aven 
and Krohn 2014). One example of such uncertainty is the disagreement among security 
experts’ about Osama bin Laden’s hiding place described in Section 1.2. However, 
despite the relatively substantial uncertainty, the US President had to take a decision 
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about the next step of the operation. This example provides a good description of this 
thesis’s assumptions: 
 There are substantial epistemic uncertainties in a security analysis, but 
 despite those uncertainties, decisions must be made. 
To work structurally with uncertainties and to provide decision support the class of the 
uncertainty must defined. Here, uncertainty is grouped into three classes 
(Abrahamsson 2002): 
 parameter uncertainty as a result of the value parameters being unknown or 
varying, 
 model uncertainty that arises from the fact that any model is a simplification of 
reality, and 
 completeness uncertainty because not all contributions to risk are addressed. 
2.2 Delimitations 
The work in this thesis is limited to decision support; it does not have the objective of 
investigating the decision process. With respect to the risk management process 
described in Figure 2, the work therefore is limited to risk analysis and the 
development of risk controls. The limitation to decision support also, in relation to the 
concept of risk-based design described in Figure 3, leads to a research focus on how to 
develop risk-knowledge models. 
The studies performed for this thesis are limited to a general perspective on military 
ship survivability and specific studies of a mine threat (Paper II), an asymmetric (low 
capability, high intent) antagonistic organisation (Paper IV) and fire survivability for 
naval ships (Paper V) and a piracy threat to civilian ships (Paper III). In this work, 
these threats are seen as a suitable combination of relevant threat types and analysis 
perspectives, but does not cover them completely. 
Government bodies claim that a considerable amount of not only data but also 
methods and tools within the area of military ship security comprise sensitive 
information that requires protection. Therefore, to avoid using classified information, 
aspects of the studies performed for Papers II, IV and V, are limited to generic 
descriptions of ships, solutions and threats. 
None of the studies covers conditions that represent a symmetric blue water naval 
combat. The reasons are that the context is thoroughly altered and that fortunately, 
during modern history such conditions have been uncommon even in symmetric 
conflicts. However, the conditions during such combat are an important special case in 
which traditional views are challenged, especially for concepts such as risk, culture and 
risk perception. Therefore, it is likely that some of the aspects and results of this study 
are invalid for such conditions. 
2.3 Utilised methods and tools 
The studies in this thesis use several existing methods and tools, as described below. 
These methods and tools are primarily chosen because they have been proven to be 
useful in maritime safety in general and because they meet the needs of a risk 
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management support approach. However, few of the methods and tools used are 
specifically tested for security cases. In this work, therefore, testing and discussing the 
suitability of these methods and tools is a goal of its own. Below is a brief introduction 
to the most central methods and tools used. 
Probabilistic risk assessment 
As described in Section 4, development in the area of ship safety is risk-based. 
Probabilistic risk assessment is seen as an approach that aims to quantify security with 
the measure of risk as a function of probabilities and consequences. The result is then 
compared with limits set by both society and the operator to decide the extent to which 
the process can be defined as safe or how the risk can be limited (Andrews and Moss 
2002). 
Therefore, the work in the appended papers utilises, where possible, the experience 
and requirements defined in the risk-based ship design (Vassalos 2009) and the Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO 2013). 
Risk management is also promoted in military planning in general (NATO 2010a; 
Swedish Armed Forces 2009a) and in different application areas (DCDC 2010; 
Department of the Army 2006; Swedish Armed Forces 2009b). However, in most of 
the military approaches, the probabilistic perspective is undeveloped. 
System or scenario definition 
A risk analysis must be performed on well-defined scenarios and systems (Hansson 
1993; IMO 2013; Vassalos 2009). Scenario definition and selection is central to the risk 
analysis process (Liwång et al. 2014) and should reflect the ship’s operational concept. 
Generally, a scenario should be developed that considers not only predictable but also 
challenging and visionary possibilities (Amer et al. 2013; Kirkwood and Pollock 1982). 
The work in Papers II, III and IV uses influence diagrams (Shachter 1988) to define 
the scenario and system and in Papers III and V, event trees are used. Influence 
diagrams are described by IMO in the Guidelines for formal safety assessment (IMO 
2013) but are more thoroughly documented in the area of decision analysis (Shachter 
1988). Papers II and III use influence diagrams to model influences and define the 
studied system. In Paper IV, the influence diagrams are also used to calculate 
probabilities for different consequences under uncertainty. 
An influence diagram (and Bayesian network) is a graphical, mathematical 
representation of the network of influences on an event. Influence diagram 
methodology is derived from decision analysis and is—according to IMO—particularly 
useful in situations for which there may be little or no empirical data available, and the 
approach is capable of identifying all of the influences and therefore underlying causal 
information (IMO 2013). 
In the area of maritime safety, Bayesian networks have been tested in different areas 
such as tools for cost-optimal inspection planning, a reliability model of buckling 
pipelines (Friis-Hansen 2000) and bridge work in a collision scenario (Pedersen 2010). 
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See Papers III and IV for more details on influence diagrams and strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Other often-suitable methods for system definitions are inductive and deductive trees, 
which also have a graphical and a mathematical dimension. Deductive fault trees are 
used in Papers III and V. 
Expert assessment 
Risk analysis is often supported by data from expert assessments due to a lack of 
empirical data on the studied systems (Yang et al. 2013; Bichou 2008; IMO 2013), 
which is the case in this thesis. However, expert assessment of probabilities often lack 
calibration and can therefore have systematic errors (Hansson 1993); moreover, for 
security, they often include substantial uncertainty (Aven and Krohn 2014). Therefore, 
the aim herein is to have experts assess threat capabilities rather than probabilities as 
often as possible. The assessed capabilities are more easily understood and can, for 
example, be calibrated using measurements or intelligence reports. The assessed 
capabilities are then linked to the risk with the system description and simulations. 
Paper II discusses the possibility of basing the threat analysis on expert assessment and 
Paper III (and Liwång and Ringsberg (2013)) tests the concept on piracy using the 
threat analysis presented in the Allied joint doctrine for force protection (NATO 
2007). 
In this work, expert assessment is collected using a combination of questionnaires and 
interviews to capture both qualitative and quantitative aspects of a threat and its 
interaction with a ship’s vulnerability. For further details, see Paper III. How the 
introduced uncertainty in the analysis can be treated and displayed is discussed in 
Paper IV.  
Simulations of operations 
To capture important aspects of maritime operations, a safety scenario is seen here as a 
model of reality to be used when analysing risks associated with the operations studied. 
When setting up the simulation, not only the variables that affect the problem but also 
the constraints and limitations must be defined. The simulation must contain a 
particular focus on the measures of effectiveness because they will provide guidance as 
to how the simulated system will be used and how different alternatives are prioritised 
(Jaiswal 1997). 
The simulations must be validated and if the results of the system operation are 
available, statistical analysis plays an important role in model validation. Military 
system studies and security studies, however, suffer from a lack of historical data, and 
realistic experiments can be impossible to perform (Jaiswal 1997). Accordingly, model 
validation is often limited to sub-model validation based on statistical data and model 
validation by expert opinion, sensitivity analysis and hypothesis validity. An example 
of a quantitative simulation of operations are displayed in Papers II and III and how 
such data can be used is discussed in Papers IV and V. 
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Quantitative uncertainty treatment 
As earlier discussed, uncertainties in security analysis can be substantial and classic risk 
analysis approaches does not provide for working with and displaying how epistemic 
uncertainties affect the result. Paper IV applies the highest level of uncertainty 
treatment where the uncertainty is displayed in the output as a family of risk estimates. 
This level requires propagating the uncertainties throughout the analysis (Paté-Cornell 
1996). 
Knowing the class of uncertainty is important because the class defines not only the 
treatment but also how and whether the uncertainty can be reduced (Abrahamsson 
2002). In the model in Paper IV, the aleatory parameter uncertainty is described as a 
probability for the discrete states of the parameters, and the epistemic parameter 
uncertainty is described as a distribution around the aleatory probabilities. This 
description is a simplification of the general case, in which the parameters can be 
continuous; the aleatory uncertainties are then described according to a probability 
density function and the epistemic parameter uncertainty is described as a family of 
probability density functions (Paté-Cornell 1996). 
There are several methods available to analyse parameter uncertainty and uncertainty 
propagation (Abrahamsson 2002). In Paper IV, Monte Carlo analysis and numerical 
derivative analysis are used to examine the uncertainties because these two approaches 
are both well-documented and feasible to implement in a real ship security analysis; 
additionally, they are based on different principles and therefore answer to different 
needs. Monte Carlo and two-phase Monte Carlo analysis make it possible to 
distinguish between different uncertainties, but require a probability distributions of 
the uncertainties (Abrahamsson 2002). Numerical derivative analysis investigates the 
sensitivity for each input but if the problem is nonlinear, that approach only works for 
relative uncertainties. 
Paper IV uses parallel models that represent different beliefs about how the studied 
phenomenon can lead to risk. In that paper, competing models are used to illustrate 
how model uncertainties can be described and analysed. In Paper V, completeness 
uncertainty is qualitatively discussed and exemplified with different future conflict 





“Over a long period of years, numerous new designs of marine vehicles 
have been developed and have been in service. While these do not fully 
comply with the provisions of the international conventions relating to 
conventional ships built of steel, they have demonstrated an ability to 
operate at an equivalent level of safety when engaged on restricted voyages 
under restricted operational weather conditions and with approved 
maintenance and supervision schedules.” 
International code of safety for high-speed craft (IMO 2000b). 
3 The operational perspective 
For naval ships total safety can never be achieved (Hughes 2000): safety efforts focus 
on reducing risk. How to assess risk is therefore crucial, especially because measures to 
reduce risk often are interconnected with each other. Therefore, how to systematically 
enhance security and military survivability is an important question for both defence 
executives involved in technology development and field commanders in tactical 
deployment. When appropriate security is achieved, freedom to act is increased by 
reducing vulnerability to the enemy’s actions (NATO 2007; University of Cincinnati 
2004). 
Fighting power is the ability to fight and achieve success in military operations. It is 
composed of three inter-related components: the conceptual, the moral and the 
physical. Success is therefore a combination of the thought process that provides an 
intellectual basis and theoretical justification for the provision and employment of 
armed forces; the ability to get people to fight both individually and collectively; and 
the means to fight (DCDC 2011). Therefore, a successful operation not only depends 
on the culture of the forces but also requires the culture to reflect reasonable 
expectations of the technology upon which an operation depends. 
Reason (2000) notes that effective safety work needs informed participants that can 
navigate close to unacceptable danger without crossing the line. Particularly in areas 
with few but severe incidents, it is difficult to develop safe work and safety measures 
from negative outcomes (historic incidents). Unfortunately, the traditional approach to 
safety in maritime design and operation is to implement prescriptive regulations, which 
generally are formulated as the result of an accident. Such regulations are suitable for 
routine activities but devolve responsibility and innovation and are unsuitable for new 
developments (Kuo 2007). The human ability to adjust to changing events is what 
preserves system safety in a dynamic world. Therefore, to constrain an operator’s 
variability undermines one of the most important safeguards. A successful culture 
knows that hazards and threats will not go away, “they anticipate the worst and equip 
themselves to cope with it” (Reason 2000). 
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According to Parker et al. (2006), a desirable safety culture does not simply emerge; 
instead, it results from many aspects. As a part of their work, Parker et al. describe 18 
organisational, key aspects (both concrete and abstract) of safety culture. These 18 
aspects of safety culture are here summarised to define three basic areas of safety 
culture, two concrete and one abstract: 
 Formal regulations and processes. 
 Competence and training, including work quality and safety observations. 
 Shared risk awareness throughout the organisation. 
Therefore, generally the conceptual and moral component of the fighting power is 
dependent on a suitable safety culture (compare with how the organizational culture 
affect and interacts with the safety culture (Grech et al. 2008)). It is a suitable safety 
culture that gives the personnel a shared and suitable understanding of the hazards and 
threats, but also an understanding of how actions taken and technology choices affects 
the risk. Therefore, this shared understanding guide individual decision makers on how 
to achieve set goals. 
From the three basic areas of safety culture it also follows that an effective safety 
design process must have a strong and obvious connection to the concept of operation. 
This is to ensure that not only regulations, competence and training but also risk 
awareness during design also are relevant during operation. The cornerstone of naval 
thinking and acting is doctrine and it is from doctrine that a concept of operation 
should be extracted. Therefore, how the (concept of) operation should be described 
and quantified is central to implementing survivability. This is especially challenging 
because neither military guidelines nor rules for classification provide a theoretical 
base for how survivability analysis results are to be weighed against other important 
aspects. This makes it difficult to provide the participants in the process, for example 
engineers and crew, with an understanding of how total safety (including both safety 
and survivability) is achieved and maintained in different situations. 
From the discussion on safety culture above it follows that the unbalance between how 
traditional maritime safety and how security is achieved (as described by Paper I) 
complicates the forming of a suitable safety culture. This is because the risk 
contribution from different areas are not reflected in the formal regulations. 
It has been shown that the greatest uncertainties (possible variation in risk) are the 
operator’s choices, such ship susceptibility implementation and operation types. For 
example, the analysis of risk controls must be done with respect to susceptibility, 
vulnerability and recoverability and an understanding of the total effect over all of 
these aspects is necessary to evaluate survivability. Risk cannot be analysed without a 
general analysis of the susceptibility and vulnerability of the ship with respect to 
relevant threats; this means that the analysis depends on relevant operational 
scenarios. For further detail, see Paper V. 
Another example of the importance of the operational perspective is firefighting on 
naval ships. Firefighting is the most important aspect for reducing the probability of 
catastrophic consequences from complicated ignitions. In such cases, built-in 
protection is insufficient to stop a fire from escalating. Reaction times and 
effectiveness with respect to firefighting on board naval vessels generally is difficult to 
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match in other firefighting situations. This is the result of extensive training, a high 
level of readiness, and a high number of crew in relation to ship size and the 
availability of firefighting equipment. Such aspects of the operation must be considered 
in the design and safety analysis if actual operational conditions should be captured. 
Therefore, shared risk awareness is created by an understanding of the operational 
effect of specific aspects, such as susceptibility or firefighting, and general aspects, such 
as threats, of the intended ship operation. 
As a result, the purpose of a security analysis is to describe the intended operation. 
The description must be formulated so that it supports a development and evolution 
of a generative safety culture, including an understanding of relevant hazards and 
threats. Therefore, the purpose of a risk analysis is greater than merely answering a 
question or putting a number on the risk. 
The purpose to understand risk as described above is for security analysis underlined 
by the fact that there most often are not any external explicit security criteria (no 
external drive for a bureaucratic safety culture). The importance of the statement 
above is also underlined by that ship operators to a large extent display a generative 
approach towards the security work (Papers III and V), i.e. the security work is a part 
of the organizational and individual understanding (Grech et al. 2008). But also that 
the studies in Papers III to V show that a generative approach is needed because many 
of the important risk controls are procedural and depend on crew actions. 
The focus on risk management support (rather than on risk quantification) has to a 
large extent defined the approach discussed (as well as the methods and tools utilized) 





“Accept no unnecessary risk. Accept no level of risk unless the potential 
gain or benefit outweighs the potential loss. [Risk management] CRM is a 
decisionmaking tool to assist the commander, leader, or individual in 
identifying, assessing, and controlling risks in order to make informed 
decisions that balance risk costs (losses) against mission benefits (potential 
gains).” 
The US Army’s approach to risk management, Composite Risk 
Management, Field Manual No. 5-19 (100-14), (Department of the Army 
2006). 
4 Risk-based approaches 
For a risk analysis to be meaningful, the decision maker must trust that analysis and 
the analysis must be valid. To achieve this there is knowledge and a set of rules that 
must be shared between the analyst and the decision maker and a deeper 
methodological knowledge must be utilised in the analysis process itself. 
4.1 Risk management 
Risk management is both a decision support process and a vital tool for military 
planning and decision-making (NATO 2010a). According to Johnson (2007) “Risk 
management provides the most important single framework for strategic, tactical and 
operational decision-making across the US military”. Risk management and its 
components, such as risk assessment and risk analysis, have been employed since the 
1950s for the control of hazards in areas such as industrial plants and space travel 
(Andrews and Moss 2002). Sometimes risk management in military or civilian 
organisations, is discussed under terms such as Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
or Composite Risk Management (CRM)—see, e.g., the Marine Corps Institute (2002); 
the Department of the Army (2006) and the U.S. Coast Guard (n.d.). However, there 
is no substantial difference between these methods and risk management in general. 
As described in Section 2.1.2, risk management is defined as the systematic application 
of management policies, procedures and practices to controlling risk. Risk 
management is often defined by (A) a risk analysis; (B) a risk evaluation; and (C) risk 
reduction and control. See Figure 3 for an illustration of typical military risk 
management and its components and sub-components. 
The results of a risk analysis must always be weighed against both risk tolerability 
levels and other operational parameters, such as financial considerations, requested 
reliability and possible operational gain. Generally, higher risks are tolerable if 
potential operational gain is high (NATO 2007, 2010a; Marine Corps Institute 2002; 
Department of the Army 2006; IACS 2012). 
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In general, probabilistic risk assessments offer a sound and systematic basis for 
evaluating potentially hazardous activity. However, their methods are specialised and 
often complex, and auditing the assessment is vital to ensure both a logical and 
consistent approach and that relevant data have been adopted (Andrews and Moss 
2002; Liwång et al. 2015; Liwång et al. 2014; IACS 2012). 
Risk evaluation must be performed against a set of risk acceptance and evaluation 
criteria (IMO 2013). For civilian shipping, such criteria exist for safety, but not for 
security. For a naval ship, such criteria must be defined by the naval administration 
(NATO 2010b). Such criteria could be composed of high-level implicit criteria that 
would imply a subjective evaluation. However, there is a drive in IMO for explicit 
evaluation criteria, such as quantifying maximum tolerable risk for individuals on 
board and on shore (Skjong 2002). The risk relative to the maximum tolerable risk is 
often presented in a Frequency—Number of fatalities (F-N) diagram (Andrews and 
Moss 2002). The F-N diagram is a cumulative diagram (exemplified in Figure 12) in 
which the risk is presented together with the F-N curve given by (Pawling et al. 2012; 
Andrews and Moss 2002): 
𝐹𝑁 = ∑ 𝑓𝑁(𝑁𝑗)
𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗=1 ,     Equation 1. 
where fN(Nj) is the number of exactly N fatalities per ship year. However, both explicit 
criteria and an F-N diagram demand a full quantitative risk analysis. 
Risk control options are means of controlling risk and are applied in high-risk areas. 
Security risk control options range from technical measures included in the design of a 
ship to specific changes to the on-board watch system/schedule. The implementation of 
control options will affect a ship’s vulnerability and therefore, the threat analysis. 
Consequently, when analysing options, there is a need to revisit the entire risk analysis. 
In civilian ship risk management, the effectiveness of risk control options are typically 
weighed against the cost of implementation (Skjong 2009; IMO 2013). In military risk 
management, the operational effects of risk controls are in focus and the cost can 
therefore often be described as a having negative effect on ship systems such as 
weapon systems or propulsion (Paper V; Liwång et al. 2001). (Liwång et al. 2001). 
4.2 Risk-based civilian maritime development 
Prescriptive codes are unsuitable for both new developments and specialised ships 
(Kuo 2007; IMO 1994). Since the 1960s, therefore, risk-based approaches have been 
developed by the IMO. The probabilistic damage stability regulation in the Safety of 
Life at Sea from 1974 (SOLAS74) was the first maritime risk-based regulation and in 
1997, IMO adopted the FSA as a risk-based approach to rule-making (Skjong 2009). 
Quantitative risk-based approaches are now well established in the area of traditional 
maritime safety. 
Risk-based approaches to ship design have been developed under the term risk-based 
ship design. As illustrated in Figure 4, in risk-based ship design, risk analysis serves as a 
knowledge model together with other knowledge models (Vassalos 2009). The purpose 
of introducing a risk-based approach is to identify risks in the operation of a ship and 
to use this information to guide concept development and ship design according to a 
risk-based ship design approach. The knowledge model is used to reduce uncertainty in 
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the design decision making, which generally is high when developing novel concepts 
(Brown and Mierzwicki 2004). 
 
Figure 4. Design decision making in risk-based ship design. This thesis’s areas of focus 
in respect to risk-based design, as described in Section 2.2, is highlighted with bold text. 
Redrawn from Vassalos (2009). 
Risk-based ship design analysis can be performed with different tools and methods to 
fulfil the requirements for the relevant design project (Vassalos 2009). The risk-
knowledge model is then used together with other knowledge models in the ship 
design, according to Figure 4. 
Changes in safety risks are often a result of changes by the ship operator or in the 
onboard environment. However, in the context of security risks, the situation can 
change dramatically even though there are no changes in ship operations. Therefore, to 
underline the complexity of security risk management, Figure 4 presents a cyclical 
version of risk management. As illustrated in Figure 4, the ship security management 
process can be seen as both highly iterative and depending on situations both on board 
and beyond the ship operator’s control. The illustration also shows the 
interdependencies between the processes, the situation on board and the political, 
economic and social situation in the areas transited and visited. An analysis of the risk-
management process shows that the work must include these iterative aspects and 
interdependencies to support decision-making. 
Figure 5 presents no effect on the external factors by the ship operators’ risk 
management, only on ship-security management from external factors. However, if 
analysis and implementation is systematic and consistently used by a majority of ship 
operators in a specific region, in the long run security management can also affect the 
security situation. This can be seen off the coast of Somalia, where implementation the 
Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4) is a 




Figure 5. Cyclical version of ship security risk management presented in Figure 4. Of additional 
importance are the dependencies between internal and external conditions and the effect of 
risk controls (Liwång et al. 2014). 
The development of ship security analysis has drawn from the experience of ship safety 
analysis but must acknowledge the differences between security and safety (Yang et al. 
2013). System definition and threat identification and analysis are co-dependent, 
cannot be performed separately and are considered more challenging for security than 
for safety (Bichou 2008; Liwång et al. 2014; Liwång et al. 2015). These two activities 
must be conducted with the particular ship and operation in mind (IMO 2013) and 
must include a threat analysis. The understanding of safety (hazard-based) risks may 
come from objective incident statistics, whereas security (threat-based) risks often 
must be described and presented using expert judgments (Yang et al. 2013). Therefore, 
when analysing security risks, there is a need for a thorough threat analysis to explain 
causes and predict risks (Bichou 2008; Liwång et al. 2014). The security analysis also 
leads to a greater need to include uncertainties (Aven and Krohn 2014). The aspect of 
uncertainty is further discussed in Paper IV. 
When analysing the conditions for risk analysis for maritime security, it is found that 
codes and guidelines prescribe a risk-based approach to ship security. However, there 
are limited descriptions of both how analysis should be performed (BIMCO 2013) and 
how adequate quality can be achieved (Bichou 2008). In particular, the scenario 
definition (Liwång et al. 2014; Liwång et al. 2015) and effects of risk perception 
(Frosdick 1997) are areas in which there is limited knowledge. Therefore, the 
challenges with respect to the security risk management process itself are as follows 
(Liwång et al. 2015): 
 the process is applied to an area (security) for which risk management is not as 
tested and relatively few tools have been developed to assist the ship operator in 
the analysis, 
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 in comparison to safety risk management, the statistics on relevant phenomena 
are limited, 
 there are no specific risk acceptance criteria for maritime security risks, and 
 there is no discussion about how to define and achieve sufficient quality in the 
analysis. 
Not only limited experience and research, but also the application area (security) itself 
leads to uncertainties that must be both decreased and presented. 
Outside the scope of this thesis but also crucial for the success of risk-based approaches 
are how to communicate, approve, inspect and control both risk-based approaches and 
control options (Liwång et al. 2015). 
4.3 Risk-based approaches to military activity 
Casualties—whether deliberate or accidental—are a reality of military operations, and 
the desire to avoid them completely may have an adverse effect on achieving the 
mission. A balance of risk is therefore required and a comprehensive risk assessment 
process is essential to guiding decision making and prioritisation related to risk 
management (NATO 2007). Therefore, military risk management is both about 
comparing risk between different possible alternatives (in design and planning) and 
about comparing expected risk with expected gain (in planning). 
Today, several nations utilise risk-based approaches to analyse the level of security in 
operations. Examples of military risk management approaches include the following: 
(1) the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive’s (COPD) description 
of the role of risk analysis in military planning (NATO 2010a); (2) risk-management 
methods for military operations by the US Department of the Army (2006), the US 
Marine Corps Institute (2002) and the Swedish Armed Forces (2009a); and (3) specific 
methods for IT security  (NATO 2008), force protection (DCDC 2010; NATO 2007), 
and antagonistic threats (Swedish Armed Forces 2009b). 
From Table 1 it can be concluded that risks related to naval ships can be discussed and 
researched from several different perspectives; this thesis discusses the assessment of 
operational risk to support decisions during design and operation. According to Table 
1, approximately five percent of the research focuses on naval operational risk. 
Table 1. Articles in Web of Science with the following search conditions: title RISK and 
(MILITARY or NAVAL) and years 2000-2013. In total, 43 unique posts were identified. 
Topic Total Naval specific 
Health and risk 12 8 
Environmental risk 11 2 
Operational risk 10 2 
Risk in system engineering processes 7 3 
Political and national security risk 3 0 
 43 15 
According to NATO, COPD analysis of operational risk is based on the probability 
and consequences of an operational failure. The risk analysis aims to identify risky 
situations and their possible consequences for mission accomplishment (NATO 2010a). 
According to COPD, the risk plays an integral role in creating situation awareness. In 
the general case, the risk should be studied over the near, mid and long term and 
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should include consequences to one’s own troops and systems, third parties and the 
environment (NATO 2010a). 
The system definition is a central task and will affect every aspect of risk estimation; 
the scenario definition will also affect which consequences can be studied (Liwång et 
al. 2014). A specific study often is, and must be, limited to specific consequences. 
However, it is not always obvious which the relevant consequences for mission 
accomplishment are, they could include: 
 own causalities, 
 own wounded, 
 collateral damage, 
 physical strain, 
 event classified as critical, 
 short term effects on the operation, 
 long term effects on the operation, and 
 damage to equipment. 
The choice of consequences to study will affect the output and the decisions made. 
Without an agreement between the decision maker and the analyst on the 
consequences to study, the analysis can be misleading. 
Military applications of risk management are substantially similar to their civilian 
predecessors, even though the civilian approach is primarily developed for hazards, 
whereas military applications often are about threats. If the focus is security rather 
than safety, particular attention must be given to the following issues: 
 the lack of objective data because each intent has its own set of probabilities, 
 the antagonistic threat, i.e., the probability of an attack is dependent on intent 
and implemented protection methods. 
This is because hazards (without intent) and threats (with intent) evolve in different 
ways into risk; therefore, they must be analysed differently to capture the causal 
relationship (Bichou 2008; Yang et al. 2013). 
Specifically for military maritime operations and in relation to ship risks the life of the 
ship is described by a set of tasks (Paper II). Some of these tasks are only performed in 
peacetime and others in wartime only. However, many tasks are assumed to be 
performed during both peace and war. For tasks performed in peacetime, the risk 
management is very similar to that of civilian risk management, i.e. to examine if the 
risk level is acceptable. In some situations, for example routine activity, acceptable risk 
could be defined by civilian regulations. In other situations, an increased risk is 
accepted because of a higher expected gain, but the civilian levels of acceptable risk (in 
relation to for example occupational risk or maritime risk as defined by IMO) are still 
relevant as a reference. However, civilian levels of acceptable risk loses their meaning 
in war. The risk management is, in a war, about weighing possible gain against risk. 
When defining the requirements for a new ship or designing naval ships available 
resources has to be weighed against the military effect that should be achieved. That 
means that navies also choose to build ships that primarily are not intended for 
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warfighting roles, but rather for set of tasks that are assumed to be performed only in a 
low threat environment (NATO 2012). From a risk management perspective it could 
therefore be claimed that the roles and tasks such ships perform (or values they 
represent) are not important enough to protect in war.  
4.4 Central aspects of the approach examined in this thesis 
As a result of Sections 3, 4.2 and 4.3 (as well as Papers I and II) three central aspects of 
the approach examined in this thesis are identified: 
 The approach must focus on expected incidents with high potential risk (that are 
initiated by a security threat). 
 The focus of the analysis is primarily to understand the incidents. 
 In order to understand future incidents available incident data has to be 
complemented by expert opinion. 
These three aspects are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Analyse expected incidents 
In the risk management, the tasks of the ship are broken down to a set of defining 
incidents and it is the description of those incident types that are defined in the risk 
analysis as scenarios. It is within these incidents the design and operational aspects of 
the ship is connected to the level of the risk. Even if a conflict is defined as symmetric 
(between equal similar forces and tactics), the tasks defined for ships are typically 
asymmetrical. Therefore, generally probabilistic approaches focusing on modelling 
tasks has proven applicable for analysing military operations (McCue 1990; Morse and 
Kimball 1998; Ewell and Hunt 1995). 
The focus on incidents and understanding security measures and operational 
alternatives also lead to that game theory based models, that could be applicable on 
the conflict and total effect of multiple decision makers (Washburn and Kress 2009), is 
not suitable as it focus on the battle (a sequence of dependent incidents) and not on 
the incidents. However, it must also be noted that there is no clear mathematical and 
methodical distinction between the probabilistic models used in the appended Papers 
II-V and basic game theory models used in decision theory described for military 
applications by Morse and Kimball (1998) and Washburn and Kress (2009). 
4.4.2 Focus of the analysis is primarily to understand the incident 
It is clear from how military doctrines define risk management that risk management is 
an approach primarily for internal knowledge collection and development. This is also 
true for the civilian risk management prescribed by the ISPS code where the analysis is 
a tool for guiding the ship operators in their decisions. This is particularly clear for 
those cases when the assessed risk is to be compared to expected gain. Therefore, in 
ship security generally the risk analysis is tool for understanding a ship’s future and 
breaking down the assumed tasks into incidents and relating those incidents to the life 
cycle risk.  
A focus on knowledge development and knowledge exchange (such as between expert 
and analysts; between analysts and decision makers; and between designers and 
operators) lead to that the methods tool used preferably also should be able to use in 
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the knowledge exchange. In Papers II-V this has led to the use of tools, particularly 
influence diagrams and event trees, with well-defined graphical and mathematical 
properties where these properties also has proven effective in knowledge exchange. 
The benefits of influence diagrams in this particular aspects has been shown by for 
example Friis-Hansen (2000) within maritime security and by Shachter (1986) within 
operational analysis. The event tree is particularly useful for describing scenarios with 
a clear time line (Andrews and Moss 2002). 
4.4.3 Incident data has to be complemented by expert opinion 
The availability of historic incident data varies within the studied areas. Generally, the 
quality of civilian security statistics is better than the military counterpart. For some 
areas, such as piracy against civilian ships off Somalia, the incident statistics are 
particularly good and is in Paper III estimated to include more than 90 percent of all 
incidents in the areas. In military analysis the relevant historic incidents are often few 
as a result of low incident frequencies and fast changing conditions (Bang 2014), see 
for example the description of attacks on naval vessels in Paper IV.  
Even if there where incident data applicable on the future such data often lack vital 
information needed to understand the causality of the incident (Bang 2014), see for 
example Ellis (2010) and Psarros et al. (2011) and how incident data can be used to 
quantify the risk, but not always explain how specific ship measures affect the risk. To 
understand how different measures affect the operation a model describing the 
operation and measures are needed (McCue 1990). For creating such a model, statistics 
have to be complemented with expert knowledge as exemplified in Papers II-V and in 
a IMO FSA on dangerous goods (IMO 2009). 
In this thesis, the reason for examining approaches with knowledge collection from 
experts is three fold: 
 to be able to capture aspects (such as causality) not captured by the data, but 
important to the ship operators risk understanding, 
 to be able to capture expected or challenging futures (as a result of future 
changes) in the security situation (the analysis must try to understand how the 
changes affect the risks), and 
 because correlation in data between aspects and risk do not imply causation, i.e. 
without an understanding of the incidents the data can give misleading answers. 
Experts however introduce uncertainties and where possible data and statistics should 
be used in the risk model to verify and validate input from experts. This also means 
that new data should be used to update existing models. 
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“It should never be forgotten that, although certification is undoubtedly 
important, what really counts is the work that has been done on the ground: 
security officers appointed on ships, in companies and port facilities; 
training undertaken; security plans drawn up; awareness raised; and 
vigilance heightened.” 
Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization, IMO: Rising to 
New Challenges (Mitropoulos 2004). 
5 Maritime security 
As stated in the Maritime Strategy of the United States of America (Department of 
Defense 2007) the world economy is tightly interconnected and 90% of world trade 
involves transported by sea. Sea lanes and the supporting shore infrastructure are 
therefore important to the global economy. Today’s military conflicts are increasingly 
characterised by a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralised planning and 
execution, and non-state actors that use both simple and sophisticated technologies in 
innovative ways against both military and civilian ships. Therefore, today’s naval 
operations are more focused on the littoral and number of mission types along with 
increasing threats (NATO 2010b). These conditions combine to create an uncertain 
future and impose new demands not only on maritme security but also on naval ships 
to counter these threats. 
The need to further develop maritime security is also recognised by non-military 
authorities such as the IMO and the European Union (Mitropoulos 2004; Council of 
the European Union 2014). 
As defined by the ISPS code, maritime security includes both port and ship security 
(IMO 2002). This thesis discusses ship security with a focus on how to assess security 
for military ships. Security for civilian and military ships is both directly and indirectly 
connected. 
5.1 Ship security 
The IMO ISPS Code (IMO 2002) results from today’s security situation and addresses 
the civilian aspects of maritime security. The code is based on the assumption that 
security of ships and ports is a risk management activity and that to determine what 
measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in each scenario. 
The purpose of the code is to provide a standardised, consistent framework for 
evaluating this risk. The code defines roles, plans and procedures for ship owners and 
port facilities as a basis for secure interaction between ships and ports. However, as a 
result of the extensive piracy off Somalia, the ship security practise has been driven by 
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concerned ship operators rather than the ISPS code (Liwång et al. 2015). That the 
development is coming from genuine needs has many positive aspects. However, the 
development today lacks a systematic collection of identified and learnt lessons. 
Security control-options range from technical measures included in a ship’s design to 
specific changes to the watch scheme on board. For example, typical and 
recommended risk control options are described in the ISPS code and the BMP4 (IMO 
2002; BIMCO 2013). However, each ship and threat combination has specific risk 
causality and therefore a specific list of suitable risk control options. These control 
options can be identified only with the help of a ship-specific, risk-based ship security 
assessment (IMO 2013). 
In the field of ship security, part A of the ISPS code stipulates that a risk-based Ship 
Security Assessment shall be performed for all passenger ships, all cargo ships above 
500 gross tons and mobile offshore units in transit. Guidelines such as the Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Association’s Guideline for performing ship security assessment 
(Norwegian Shipowners' Association 2008) divide the ship security assessment into 
four general parts: initial screening, threat assessment, onboard audit and identification 
of needs. The threat assessment is defined by the following two steps (Norwegian 
Shipowners' Association 2008): 
 Identify threat scenarios, or security incident scenarios, that reflect motives and 
prioritised operations, areas, systems and personnel. 
 Assess the likelihood and potential consequences of the scenarios in relation to 
the ship’s vulnerability. 
Ship security is of importance for both military and civilian organisations and often 
during operation, a security decision made by one will affect the other (Council of the 
European Union 2014). Therefore, approaches and research from both areas are 
discussed below; however, the focus is on military ship security. 
5.1.1 Principles for ship security 
In ”Principles of engineering safety: Risk and uncertainty reduction”, Möller and 
Hansson (2008) discuss the principles of engineering safety and suggest the following 
four principles (Möller and Hansson 2008): 
 Inherently safe design, which means that potential hazards or threats are 
excluded. 
 Safety reserves with safety factors or safety margins. 
 Fail-safe systems so that if it fails, it does so safely. 
 Procedural safeguards in which procedures and training is used to enhance safety. 
Often, systems are designed with a combination of the principles above, and some 
applied approaches can be said to belong to more than one principle (Möller and 
Hansson 2008). 
The list can also be seen as arranging the principles from straightforward to complex or 
from low uncertainty to high uncertainty. Therefore, demands on the decision process 
are increased if the later safety principles from the above list are used. 
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By analysing suggested ship security measures (or risk control options) in the “Best 
management practice for protection against Somalia based piracy” (UKMTO 2011); 
the appendix to the ISPS code (IMO 2002); the “Survivability of small warship and 
auxiliary naval vessels” (NATO 2012) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) “Rules for 
Classification of High Speed, Light Craft and Naval Surface Craft” (DNV 2013), it is 
found that the focus is on safe fail and procedural safeguards. With respect to safe fail 
the ship must be built to be operational, with constraints, even if there is an attack. 
Measures such as physical or immaterial barriers, redundancy, segregation and 
diversity are typical for maritime security and Möller and Hansson (2008) classify them 
as fail operational.  
Procedural safeguards with respect to ship security can be exemplified by, but are not 
limited to, prepared procedures for the crew if the ship is under attack and special 
emergency organisations onboard to handle the effects of an attack such as fire and 
flooding. 
The fact that ship security relies to a large extent on safe fail and procedural safety 
does not necessarily increase the risk, but increases the epistemic uncertainty about the 
function or effectiveness of the security system. This increased uncertainty leads to an 
increased need to address and understand uncertainties throughout the decision 
process (as discussed in Sections 3 and 4.3). This because procedural safeguards in 
particular depend on the actions of the crew, which are partially a function of the 
safety culture. There is therefore a strong connection between the situation on board 
and the effectiveness of the security measures as shown in Figure 5 and underline the 
need for using a socio-technological system perspective. 
5.2 Naval ship survivability 
In this thesis, naval ship survivability is seen as a sub-component of ship security 
relevant to protection against physical attack. For military ships survivability is often 
discussed in terms of susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of the ship (Ball 
and Calvano 1994; Boulougouris and Papanikolaou 2013; NATO 2010b; Said 1995; 
Kim and Lee 2012; Hughes 1995), here defined according to: 
 Susceptibility is the inherent inability of the ship (including tactical measures) to 
avoid a hit and governs the probability of a hit (PH). 
 Vulnerability is the inherent inability of the ship to resist damage and governs the 
probability of kill (or damage) given a hit (PK|H). 
 Recoverability is the ability of and the crew the ship systems to return the ship to 
operational capability and governs the probability of damage repaired (PR). 
In a military operation, a ship’s survivability is also determined by force protection 
measures. Force protection is an enabling activity by which threats and hazards to the 
force are countered and mitigated to maintain an operating environment that enables 
freedom of action (DCDC 2010). Subsequently, it is neither possible nor necessary to 
distinguish fully between survivability and force protection: survivability represents a 
design perspective, and force protection represents an action perspective. 
It is clear that Cold War tactics to eliminate an opponent or its engagement system 
before they could hit ships is an overly simplistic description of modern naval warfare 
(Ball and Calvano 1994). It is no longer possible to treat vulnerability and 
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recoverability as constants and to assume that a hit equals a ship kill (Boulougouris 
and Papanikolaou 2013; Ball and Calvano 1994; Hughes 1995; Kim and Lee 2012; 
Harney 2010). In coastal areas, threats are more difficult to detect and avoid because 
of short reaction times. Accordingly, there is an increased focus on vulnerability and 
recoverability (Harney 2010), which is especially challenging for small warships 
(NATO 2012). To meet the new challenges posed by today’s warfare, including 
asymmetric and littoral warfare, survivability must be examined more closely and must 
present timely contributions to the systems engineering process (Said 1995; Harney 
2010).  
The, instant killability of a ship is the product of the probability of a hit (PH) and the 
probability of damage given a hit (PK|H). Survivability (PS) is the opposite of killability 
and if only primary and secondary effects are studied without recoverability, 
survivability is given by 
PS = 1-(PH·PK|H). Equation 2. 
If recoverability (PR) is included, survivability is given by 
PS = 1-(PH·PK|H·(1-PR)). Equation 3. 
The concept of survivability is thus most often described in probabilistic terms (Ball 
and Calvano 1994; Hughes 1995; Kim and Lee 2012). 
A ship kill need not be total and therefore can be defined in relation to different 
severity levels, such as the following (Ball and Calvano 1994; Boulougouris and 
Papanikolaou 2013): 
 System kill in which one or more components are damaged and system failure 
results. 
 Mission kill in which the ability to solve a particular mission is killed. 
 Mobility kill in which the ship has lost its ability to manoeuvre. 
 Total kill in which the ship either is lost or must be abandoned. 
Important technical measures include redundancy and separation (see Kim and Lee 
(2012) for a probabilistic description of these concepts), but the discussion can also 
include top-level aspects such as fleet composition and ship numbers (Harney 2010; 
Hughes 1995). 
It is the ship operator’s responsibility to structurally (with the help from organisational 
knowledge) identify threats, hazards and control options. This ensures that control 
options are documented and inspecting and approving bodies can test the analysis. 
As illustrated in Figure 6, hazards and threats to military ships largely lead to 
catastrophe scenarios similar to those of civilian ships. However, survivability after 
hostile attack—divided into susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability—has 
military-specific aspects that must be analysed. In addition, the needs of the analysis 
differ between the three survivability aspects as discussed in the following Sections. 
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Figure 6. Typical catastrophe scenarios developed from (Vassalos 2009). White aspects indicate 
catastrophe scenarios common to civilians and the military. Grey aspects indicate a uniquely 
security-oriented security perspective. 
5.2.1 Assessing susceptibility 
To estimate the probabilities directly and indirectly connected to susceptibility, the 
modus operandi of a threat and ship actions must be either known or assumed. The 
design concept directly affects tactics, ship susceptibility and ship vulnerability and 
indirectly affects those threat characteristics that depend on ship characteristics. 
Therefore, the reliability and consistency of assessed susceptibility depend on well-
specified tasks, type of operation and type of threat. Without these specifications, 
assumptions are required, which can reduce reliability. The reliability also depends on 
a structured and documented analysis of how different aspects interact. The validity 
and relevance of the analysis depend on specified tasks and threats, which respond to 
the actual ship use, and the scenarios and analyses, which must sufficiently consider the 
complexity of ship operations. The effect of susceptibility on risk and its role in a risk 
analysis is further discussed in Paper V. 
5.2.2 Assessing vulnerability 
To estimate the probabilities connected to vulnerability, a hit or attack is normally 
assumed. Accordingly, the vulnerability assessment is not as dependent on threat 
modus operandi or ship actions; instead, it is more dependent on physical attributes of 
the attack, including weapon and ammunition specifications with respect to the ship’s 
technical specification. 
Survivability analyses are well-established (civilian and military examples are discussed 
in Paper V). However, these models require a correct and validated model to describe 
post-attack damage. Moreover, the input must describe and include how the 
probability of impact/hit position is a result of weapon characteristics, such as is the use 
of a technically governed weapon (anti-ship missiles) or shooter predisposition 
governed weapons (hand-held, anti-tank grenade launchers) interact with aspects such 
as signature management and ship tactics. 
5.2.3 Assessing recoverability 
Recoverability depends on a physical description of the damage, its effect on ship 
functions and how it can be temporarily or permanently “fixed” by the crew. 
An analysis of the failure of recoverability must include crew performance, which for 
complicated damages can make a substantial contribution to survivability. Several 
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approaches can be used to estimate crew performance and model crew effectiveness in 
a recoverability scenario. The literature also includes research into how incident 
statistics can be analysed to support the selection of risk-control measures, including 
crew performance (Akhtar and Utne 2014). In such an analysis, expert opinions are 
central, but it is important for the experts to have relevant experience and if possible, 
to use empirical data and calibrate techniques (Deacon et al. 2013). To validate model 
output, historical events must be analysed, full-scale experiments must be performed, 
and the effects of current training must be analysed. One example of a relevant, full-
scale experiment is the Operational Sea Training performed by the Flag Officer Sea 
Training for the UK Royal Navy (Royal Navy 2014). A structural use of the experience 
and data from such experiments could be used to develop naval-specific human error 
and causation factor models. (See Paper V for further details about analysing the 
crew’s role with respect to recoverability.) 
5.3 The appropriate focus of ship security analysis 
According to Section 2.1.2 and Figure 3 the risk management process contains several 
steps. The three sections below discuss that has to be considered. These aspects require 
special consideration in a ship security analysis. 
5.3.1 Threat and scenario definition and selection 
Before the effect of design decisions can be analysed, the operational environment 
must be defined. Pursuant to the doctrine, the relevant state must extract a concept of 
operation valid for design, construction and operation. The manner in which the 
concept of operation is described and quantified is central to the implementability of 
military survivability, and scenario definition and selection is central in the risk-
analysis process (Liwång et al. 2014), see also Papers I and V further detail. The threat 
and scenario definition is particularly critical in ship security because the suitable 
scope, system and consequences to study vary substantially from analysis to analysis. 
Design scenarios must be created based on the relevant identified threats. When 
generic design scenarios are available, they must be adapted and customised to the 
specific features and expected performance of the vessel in question (IMO 2013; 
Vassalos 2009). 
The definition of future scenarios is an effective way to support analysis of the future 
(Meissner and Wulf 2013), but cannot be limited to a prolongation of the present, they 
must include surprises (Derbyshire and Wright 2014). The scenarios need not to 
accurately predict the future, but they should capture possible futures (Meissner and 
Wulf 2013) without misleading decision makers as to their reliability (Gershuny 1976). 
Quality aspects to consider when choosing scenarios include that there should be 
multiple scenarios to account for uncertainty and each scenario must be plausible; 
internally consistent; relevant; and contribute to the analysis (Amer et al. 2013). The 
definition process include both qualitative and quantitative aspects (Amer et al. 2013). 
The probability of each of these future conditions should be estimated (Kirkwood and 
Pollock 1982) and today, there is an increasing focus on also including uncertainties in 
the analysis (Aven and Krohn 2014; Derbyshire and Wright 2014; Brown and 
Mierzwicki 2004). Relevant historical information is often limited and expert judgment 
is needed to define scenarios (Kirkwood and Pollock 1982; IMO 2013). In addition to 
defining ship tasks, the threat description is the most important input to the scenario 
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definition and must both be quantitative and support a scenario definition that 
captures the life cycle risk (Law 2011). The description must therefore be developed 
specifically for the ship and tactical tasks at hand (IMO 2013; Vassalos 2009). The 
intelligence community is responsible for developing the threat description (Said 
1995). 
The scenarios must also consider the effectiveness (or gain) of the operation, especially 
if the scenario should be used to compare ship concepts that solve the intended 
operation differently. There exist theoretical frameworks for quantitatively connecting 
measures of operational outcome and for measuring effectiveness and component 
system performance (Perry 2007). However, the purpose of a risk-based survivability 
design process is to compare different risk-control measures in the form of concepts, 
systems and components. The focus is therefore on relative risk, and it is unnecessary 
to describe the risk in absolute terms. It is therefore possible to introduce some 
simplifications, such as a set of scenarios that keep the potential gain constant and 
examines the risk for different ship concepts. 
The analysis documented in the NATO Force Protection Directive (NATO 2007) can 
be used to perform a stringent threat analysis (an example is presented in Paper III 
and is further investigated in Liwång and Ringsberg (2013)). The analysis determines 
the capabilities and intentions of an identified group or organisation and how likely it 
is to carry out its defined threat and actions. The threat analysis focuses not on the 
threat in isolation but also on the threat in relation to the vulnerability of the ship in 
question (NATO 2007).  
When analysing the threat and defining the scenario, there must be a focus on the 
threat’s modus operandi, identifying how these modus operandi can lead to ship 
damage and whether the intended ship tasks limits the number of relevant modus 
operandi. In addition, it is important to determine how the likelihood of different 
attack modus operandi is affected by ship tasks and ship susceptibility. The scenario 
must be developed for specific ship concepts, and a change in ship concept can change 
the probability of threat encounter and/or the probability of the success of the threat 
(NATO 2007). 
5.3.2 Ship design considerations and their effect on the intended operation 
Early in the design definition the design approach to critical systems, such as 
redundancy and separation; fire protection; ballistic protection; damage stability; and 
man-machine interfaces, must be set. These aspects are important not only to ship 
military survivability but also to the design in general. The design of such systems have 
their own design rationality and methods; today, however, they must also be 
performed with respect to survivability goals and in relation to other design areas. 
The studies on ship transit through an area with mine threats, ship security attacks, an 
asymmetric threat to an Ocean Patrol Vessel (OPV) and fire onboard naval vessels all 
show that risk always depends not only on technology choices but also on crew and 
ship actions. Many technology choices are made early in the design process and must 
be tailored for the operation. 
Damage stability is an example of a ship design area not only with its own research but 
also with important survivability implications. Probabilistic damage stability was the 
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first probability ship design area to be systematically investigated. Substantial research 
and tools exist today, including real time simulation of ships’ survivability in waves 
validated with model tests (Schreuder et al. 2011). These simplified approaches have 
some limitations, specifically with respect to hull shape and speed. However, these 
limitations will not affect the possibility of investigating a damaged naval ship. The 
models require a physical description of the hull damage. One example of how these 
tools can be used for naval ships is in Boulougouris and Papanikolaou (2013) and their 
optimisation of water-tight subdivision related to weapon hits. 
Another central area for military survivability is a crew’s possible contribution before, 
during and after attacks. These activities are performed within a context that includes a 
broad range of human, technical, organisational and environmental factors that can 
influence, but not necessarily determine, an operator’s performance in a system 
(Liwång et al. 2015; Musharraf et al. 2013). There are gaps in the literature related to 
the effects of security threats on crew performance. However, typical reactions to 
stressors include cognitive, emotional and social effects. The stress effects will lead to 
poor decisions. Therefore, in a situation with a perceived security threat, there are 
fewer resources to perform the task at hand, and the likelihood of errors increases 
(Liwång et al. 2015). 
It is important for the analysis of crew effectiveness to acknowledge that well-learned 
skills and well-rehearsed tasks require less attentional control and thus, performing 
these tasks is less affected by stress (Beilock et al. 2002; Fisk and Schneider 1984; Smith 
and Chamberlin 1992). Moreover, well-designed systems enhance the performance of a 
given task. Therefore, it is important to ensure the inclusion of education, training and 
human factor design aspects in any assessment of crew effectiveness (Liwång et al. 
2015). Musharraf et al. (2013) and Deacon et al. (2013) present quantitative 
approaches to human reliability assessment applied to offshore emergency conditions. 
There are also studies on causation—i.e., the probability that a crew member will not 
act as he or she is supposed to (Ravn 2012). 
Subsequently, survivability design includes a plethora of aspects and design areas (of 
which only two are presented in this section). Such decision areas all have their own 
knowledge base and experts and no design will be successful without using appropriate 
approaches and experts. 
5.3.3 A successful analysis 
A successful analysis that correctly compares military survivability among alternative 
designs must include the following aspects (generalised from Paper V, a study on fire 
survivability): 
 The relationship between design choices and the probability of incidents, such as 
a hit. There is a relationship between general design choices (and their 
operational implications) and the probability of incidents. Characterising this 
relationship depends on the threat. These relationships must be described and 
analysed for multiple scenarios to account for uncertainty, and each scenario 
must be plausible, internally consistent, relevant, and contribute to the analysis. 
Specifically for fire survivability, this refers to the relationship between design 
choices and ignition probability that has to be included in the analysis. 
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 The state of the ship at the incident. This description depends on the specifics of 
the ship and will vary for the same scenario among concepts due to differences in 
ship tactics, susceptibility and vulnerability. Different concepts will require 
different passive and active protection, depending on the differences in how the 
concepts are designed and manned. Specifically for fire survivability, this means 
that analysis of the fire escalation required to estimate the consequences depends on 
a physical and system description of the ship upon ignition. 
 Complicated incidents with potentially severe consequences (i.e., those that likely 
will contribute substantially to the total risk). Specifically for fire survivability, this 
refers to complicated fire ignition cases. These cases differ from typical civilian 
ignition cases due to additional complexity caused by added fuel (from weapons), 
potentially multiple dependent ignitions and severe damage to the structure and 
systems. 
 Qualitative human factor aspects of the design, which managed effectively, can 
reduce the consequences of potentially catastrophic incidents. Therefore, the 
analysis also depends on discerning qualitative human factor design aspects in 
addition to technical aspects. Specifically for fire survivability, this means that the 
firefighting is crucial under conditions with a high-risk contribution, and the 
effectiveness of firefighting may be high. 
 Naval specific models and data. Specific models and data, along with further 
validation, are necessary both generally and specifically for signature 
management effects, military-unique vulnerability data (such as ignition models), 
crew performance and fire characteristics of military-specific equipment onboard. 
In general, the reliability and validity of identifying incidents is relatively dependent on 
a qualitative and outward-focused analysis of the ship’s future. The reliability and 
validity of the analysis of incident consequences depends on specific data and 
descriptions of the ship used. This analysis must be based on an understanding of 
operational conditions. Therefore, the civilian risk-based approaches are not 
applicable to naval ships because they do not guarantee that relevant aspects of ship 
design and the intended operation are included in the analysis. Furthermore, 
vulnerability tools lack this ability. However, when the incidents are defined, civilian 
methods and tools can be used to assess the consequences if the ship specifications are 




“The community of risk analysts would easily interpret … a high-level 
evaluation criteria. It is, however, unlikely that the interpretation by different 
analysts would be identical.” 
Det Norske Veritas chief scientist on IMO risk criteria (Skjong 2002). 
6 The merits of a quantitative approach 
Humans are notoriously unskilled at estimating probabilities and comparing 
probabilities, especially in regard to incidents for which we have strong feelings. Such 
feelings will influence the performance of risk analysis and can skew the results, 
exaggerate high-profile risks and under-predict common risks (Kahneman 2011). 
However, history also shows that conveying an idea of a probability in qualitative 
terms is easily misunderstood. This is exemplified in the 1961 assessment of the 
strategic prospects for a US invasion of the Bay of Pigs. In their report, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff reported pessimism about the success of the plan, using the term “a fair chance 
of success”. However, the US President understood the report as optimistic about the 
probability of success (Friedman 2014). Therefore, actually assigning a number to an 
estimated likelihood is—at least—less unambiguous. 
As described in Section 4.2, the risk-based maritime safety approaches are most often 
quantitative; see, e.g., the IMO top-level rule-making approach (FSA) (IMO 2013) and 
the IMO damage stability criteria (Vassalos 2009). The suitable extent of quantitative 
tools and criteria in approaches to maritime security is, however, ungoverned. Here, a 
quantitative approach is defined as an approach that uses numbers to express 
likelihood and consequences in absolute terms. 
Sections 6.1 to 6.3 present three examples of how quantitative data can be used in a 
security analysis. 
6.1 Application example 1: skiff approach probability 
In offshore piracy attacks on transiting ships, the speed of the ship has been proven to 
be one of the most important aspects of ship security. An increased ship speed 
substantially reduces the risk of a successful piracy attack. During the high-piracy 
activity years in the waters off Somalia (2008-2011), there were no reported attacks in 
which pirates had boarded a ship that was proceeding at more than 18 knots (IMB 




Figure 7. Incident statistics (binary data) for non-monsoon months in 2010 and 2011 plotted 
against ship maximum speed (dots) (Liwång and Ringsberg 2013). The dots at the bottom of 
the graph represents fail attacks and the dots at the top successful attacks. 
At the same time, it is clear that many piracy skiffs can travel much faster than 18 
knots and statistical reports have described skiffs that have matched speeds as high as 
25 knots (IMB 2012). It is therefore possible that pirate tactics and techniques may 
develop to enable them to board ships at faster speeds. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
argue that ship operators need more information about how ship speed affects the 
attack probability. This is so that increased ship speed can be weighed against aspects 
such as routing alternatives, extra fuel costs and the use of armed guards. Figure 8 
presents an analysis of approach success probability (Liwång and Ringsberg 2013) 
(Liwång and Ringsberg (2013) develops the models and results in Paper III). The 
analysis is fully based on expert input on the scenario according to Figure 9. 





































Figure 8. Calculated probability based on expert knowledge of a successful approach as a 
function of ship speed calculated for wave heights of 1, 1.5 and 2 metres (Liwång and 
Ringsberg 2013) compared to statistics. The dotted lines display the probability of a successful 
approach for all events. The solid line display the probability only for incidents not aborted 
before the ship sees the skiff. 
 
Figure 9. Influence diagram of approach scenario, assuming that the ship is within detection 
distance of a skiff (Liwång and Ringsberg 2013). See Paper III for expert data and Liwång and 
Ringsberg (2013) for simulation details. 
There is a clear correlation between the probability of successful approach and ship 
speed in both the statistics (Figure 7) and the expert-based simulation results (Figure 
8). It is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of pirates initiating an attack 
decreases with higher waves. Therefore, the amount of attacks at different wave 
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heights is not constant, which makes it difficult to merge the probabilities for different 
wave heights in Figure 8 into a total probability that can be compared to the reported 
frequency in Figure 7. However, a comparison between the simulation results for the 
significant wave height 1.5 meters, which is a common wave height and makes attacks 
feasible, with the logistic fit showing the calculated probability, is both reasonable and 
cannot be rejected by the statistics at hand. Therefore, it can be assumed that the 
performed analysis captures several important aspects of the approach sequence. 
According to the calculations, the probability of successful approach is for 18 knots 
never higher than 5%. From the simulations it can be found that this is a result of the 
speed range of the skiffs, and also that the wave system generated by the ship under 
attack at this speed makes it difficult to get close to the ship even if the sea otherwise is 
calm. 
Defining the probability of successful approach as a function of speed and detection 
distance, as performed in Figure 8, rather than defining a secure speed as performed in 
the BMP, is a much more reasonable description of the threat. This probability 
function can guide the ship owners to better decisions. Worthy of note, as seen in 
Figure 9, is that the analysis is largely based on input such as skiff speeds, detection 
distance, wave height and other parameters that are easy to measure and quantify. This 
reduces the need for subjective probability estimates. 
6.2 Application example 2: uncertainty in risk estimates 
The influence diagram in Figure 10 models how design and operational aspects affect 
the probability of three examined consequences (crew injuries, the ship buoyancy and 
the ship ability to manoeuvre) as a result of an attack. 
 
Figure 10. Influence diagram based on expert knowledge for assessing the probability of the 
consequences studied (Paper III). Values are calculated without epistemic uncertainties. The 
influences and solid arcs represent the base alternative (Alt. 0), and the dashed arch from s4 to 
s7 represents an alternative model (Alt. 1). The influence diagram was created using GeNIe, by 
the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University of Pittsburgh (Decision Systems 
Laboratory 2014). 
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As discussed in Sections 1.2 and 2.1.3, uncertainties in expert based security 
assessments are often substantial. In the model, aleatory parameter uncertainty is 
included in the probabilistic characteristics of the influence diagram. Epistemic 
parameter uncertainty is included as a probability density function for the conditional 
probabilities for each influence as described in Table 2. The highest uncertainty is for 
the probability that describes whether or not the threat has a high intent (ranging from 
0.0 to 0.7, which is about the same uncertainty as reported in discussion on bin Laden’s 
hiding place described in Section 1.2). Epistemic model uncertainty is included in 
different relations between influences and within the definition of the conditional 
probabilities for some influences (the model and uncertainties are described in detail in 
Paper IV). 
Table 2. Modelled systems, influences, probabilities and uncertainties. Influence 4 (s4) has the 
highest uncertainty, here estimated as an even distribution between 0 and 0.7. See Paper IV for 
values of the probabilities and epistemic uncertainties. 
Influence States [state 1; state 2, …] 
s1  Ship tasks patrol 
s2  Ship activity sea; coast 
s3  Ship speed [knots] 0;5;15 
s4 Threat intent high; low 
s5  Threat capability high; low 
s6  Threat probability high; low 
s7  Detonation position along ship fore; mid; aft; miss 
s8 Detonation distance from ship at; close; far  
s9 Detonation power high; low 
s10 Detonation impact high; med; low 
s11 Injured high; low 
s12 Casualties high; low 
s13 Damaged compartments [number of] 0;1;2;3 
s14 Propulsion damaged yes; no 
s15 Navigational command and control damaged yes; no 
s16 Reorganisation capability [number of tasks] 0;1;≥2 
s17 Crew effect high; low 
s18 Float yes; no 
s19 Move yes; no 
The primary design decisions in the model studied here are as follows: 
 The probabilities are calculated given the occurrence of an attack. 
 The model analyses the effects on the ship 30 minutes after the attack. 
 Here, several influences are defined by qualitative states. For a specific ship, 
these influences would be defined by quantitative (continuous) states; see for 
example s7, s8, s9, s10 and s12. 
 Here, reorganisation is defined as restructuring the crew to concentrate on core 
survival activities. 
 In the model (all model alternatives), restoring watertight integrity is prioritised 
before restoring propulsion and navigational command and control. 
 Weather and degree of closed watertight doors are included in s19. 
 Some influences are known with high accuracy (low epistemic uncertainty), see, 
e.g., s13. 
 Some parts of the influence diagram function as logic operators and do not 
introduce parameter uncertainty. These influences can, however, introduce 
model uncertainty. 
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In this study, each of the different conditional probabilities that describe each 
influence (s1-s19) is itself described with a variable (x1-x61). 
In Figure 11, the uncertainty of the three target influences is displayed together with 
the expected value calculated with the mode and median values. The biggest 
interquartile distance is for influence 17 and is 0.04. 
Ignoring the epistemic uncertainties and using the most probable values for the input 
will not give the most probable output according to the Monte Carlo analysis. See 
especially the difference between the expected value and the box-plot median for 
influences 17 and 19 in Figure 11. Note that both calculations are based on the same 
expert input (however, when calculating the expected value, the expert uncertainty is 
ignored). 
The output uncertainty is small relative to the input uncertainty. The maximum input 
uncertainty is 0.7 and 0.1 to 0.2 for many input variables. The inter-quartile distances 
for the output are 0.04, 0.004 and 0.02 for influence 17 state 2, influence 18 state 1 and 
influence 19 state 1, respectively. 
 
Figure 11. The output uncertainty for influences 17, 18 and 19 based on the Monte Carlo 
analysis. The expected value is the value calculated without epistemic uncertainties, i..e. only 
calculated based on the respective variables’ expected value (if an even distribution) or mode 
values (if a triangular distribution). 
The box plots for the three output parameters in Figure 11 give a good understanding 
of how uncertainties affect output, including not only the most probable values but also 
the tails. Such results give the analyst and the decision maker the information needed 
to take the total uncertainty into account, not only the expected probability and 
consequences. 
High uncertainty can give rise to two different needs: one is to decrease the uncertainty 
in the analysis and the other is to find a protection solution with a lower uncertainty, a 
robust solution. When the aim is to decrease uncertainty, the parameter uncertainty 
must be revisited. To revisit parameter uncertainty requires structural knowledge of 
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
expected value
probability for low effect on the crew (s17, state 2)
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
expected value
probability for that the ship will float (s18, state 1)
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1
expected value
probability for that the ship can move (s19, state 1)
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how the different input parameters contribute to output uncertainty. This contribution 
can be estimated by the numerical derivative analysis, which investigates the sensitivity 
for each input. In that analysis, the term ∂y⁄(∂xi) is used as a measure of how an 
uncertainty in xi (one of the conditional probabilities describing a influence) will affect 
the output. In this study, the term ∂y⁄(∂xi) is numerically calculated for each variable 
with uncertainty and is shown in Table 4. See Section 7.4 and Paper IV for details of 
the data, output, analysis and methods. 
The numerical derivative analysis clearly indicate which input must be revisited. 
Deriving similar results from the Monte Carlo analysis is calculation intensive. From 
the results, it is clear that the proposed approach can assess the risk, examine the 
uncertainties and be described to the decision maker. However, the results also show 
that this type of approach is needed for understanding which variables affect output 
uncertainty. Noteworthy is also that, according to Table 4, the only variable 
uncertainty with high effect on all three examined consequences is the variable 
describing the ship activity (operation concept). 
6.3 Application example 3: fire as the result of weapon attack 
When the fire risk for a naval ship is analysed, both accidental ignitions (such as the 
ignitions in civilian operations) and ignitions by weapon hits must be examined. For 
standard military operations, weapon hits yield a lower ignition frequency compared to 
accidental fires. However, as shown in Table 3, because of the severer consequences 
the risk contribution from weapon hits is several orders of magnitude greater than 
from accidental fires. Therefore, considering aspects such as general susceptibility can 
be an effective way of reducing fire risk, and ignoring the effects of different design 
choices will risk penalising design choices that can have a positive effect on combat 
effectiveness. 
Table 3. Magnitude of the fire risk contribution from different types of ignition and operation 
developed based on Tables 2 and 4. The data and analysis approaches are presented in Paper V.  
Case type Risk contribution     
 Civ op  Std mil op   High risk mil op 
   Std ship Low susc 
ship 
 Std ship Low susc ship 








































Figure 12 presents the fire risk for the examined operations types in an F-N diagram in 
relation to IMO risk safety criteria for civilian ships. As expected, the risk contribution 
from fire onboard naval ships is high compared to civilian operations, especially for 
high-risk operations. Figure 12 shows that the level of risk is greater for incidents with 
potentially serious consequences compared to high-frequency incidents. 
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Figure 12. F-N diagram for the magnitude of fire risk given different types of operations. The 
data are calculated according to equation 1 and the data in Paper V. The IMO civilian as Low 
As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) region developed from IMO (2000a) included as 
reference. 
Based on Figure 12, when standard military operations using low-susceptibility ships 
are compared with high-risk operations using a standard ship, the greatest 
uncertainties (possible variations in risk) are associated with the operator’s choices in 
terms of ship susceptibility and types of operation. Therefore, even if a ship fulfils its 
fire requirements, the fire risk can be unnecessarily high if the relationship among 
operation, design and risk is not understood. 
Based on Equation 3, risk controls must be analysed with respect to susceptibility, 
vulnerability and recoverability; the total effect of these aspects must be understood to 
evaluate military survivability. Fire risk cannot be analysed without a general analysis 
of a ship’s susceptibility and vulnerability with respect to relevant threats, which 
indicates that the analysis depends on relevant operational scenarios. Physical 
descriptions of fire depend on ship specifications and in the same operational scenario, 
the fire probability will vary between ship concepts due to differences in ship tactics, 
susceptibility and vulnerability. Different design concepts will also require different 
passive and active fire protection depending on the differences in the design and how it 
is manned. 
Firefighting is the most important aspect for reducing the probability of catastrophic 
consequences from complicated ignition cases because built-in protection is insufficient 
to stop the escalation of a fire. This exemplifies the need for procedural safeguards, as 
discussed in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, application example 3 shows that without 
calculating the risk it is not possible to compare operational alternatives or to 
understand the importance of firefighting. 
6.4 A quantitative approach supports a qualitative discussion 
Risk analysis can be qualitative, but quantitative assessment is needed if the result 
should be able to update, validate or compare to risk acceptance criteria (Papers III-V, 
Liwång et al. (2014) and Liwång et al. (2015)). Quantitative analysis is also a 
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prerequisite for stringent estimates of probabilities and consequences, a basis for 
shared risk awareness (a topic further discussed in Paper III). 
It is not possible to perform the three exemplified analyses presented in Sections 6.1 to 
6.3 without a quantitative approach. However, the examples also show that an 
extensive amount of qualitative knowledge is needed to create the system/scenario, as 
exemplified in Figures 9 and 10. 
Stringent scenario definition and unambiguous documented inputs and uncertainties 
are possible with a quantitative approach. The approach that facilitates the following: 
 Structured use of easily measurable aspects (data) in the analysis, which reduces 
the aspects that need to be analysed and removes unrealistic consequences. 
 Definition and analysis of uncertainties. For most realistic scenarios, without such 
an analysis it is impossible to judge which uncertainties are problematic and 
which may be ignored. 
 Critical and objective examination of the analysis. 
 Knowledge transfer to fleet management, on-board tactics and crew training. 
 An update of the analysis if more data are acquired or more knowledge about the 
system is obtained (i.e., it is easy to identify what must be changed, and the effect 
of the change is automatic). 
Quantitative aspects that can be clearly defined (as exemplified in Figures 8 and 9) 
reduce scenario alternatives and therefore decrease the work needed (see, e.g., the 
discussion of skiff speed in waves in Paper III). A quantitative approach also quantifies 
important aspects, such as available time for counter measures, which can be used, e.g., 
in training to create relevant readiness (Paper II). Therefore, by using a quantitative 
approach, naval administrators can qualitatively and quantitatively explain the 
rationality behind the chosen scenarios. 
The result of the three examples above and highlighted in the interviews performed as 
a part of Application example 1 above show that the following: 
A combination of graphical illustration and quantitative output based on 
quantitative data and qualitative descriptions not only calculates probabilities but 
also enables a qualitative discussion on causes and measures that is impossible with 
the qualitative analysis often performed today. Such a discussion is very valuable in 
the decision-making process. 
Therefore, risk analysis is a part of an operations knowledge system, and its 
quantitative aspects guarantee unambiguous transfer of knowledge. 
However, the interviews within this study also make it clear that the proposed method 





“This thesis would not have been possible without a broad approach and 
support from research colleagues with different scientific perspectives, naval 
experts from the Royal Swedish Navy and ship owners’ safety, security and 
operation managers.” 
The author of this thesis about 40 pages earlier (Preface, page iii). 
7 Summary of the work in the appended papers 
7.1 Paper I 
The aim of Paper I was to investigate and describe the effects of the NSC (NATO 
2010b) on efforts to enhance ship survivability. The study is a qualitative case study 
with two cases: ballistic protection of smaller naval vessels and bridge configuration to 
minimise the effects of attacks, two aspects of design alternatives affecting technology, 
tactics and manning, according to Figure 13. The two cases were chosen so that they 
would cover a range of requirement types. In these two areas, the NSC regulations 
(i.e., the aims, goals, functional areas, performance requirements and verification 
methods) are compared to survivability measures. The result is discussed in terms of 
how the NSC affects total safety efforts. 
 
Figure 13. Measure of comparative effectiveness to support decisions related to design, 
construction and operation. 
The NSC was compared with the types of measures called for in the two cases to 
determine how the code directly and indirectly interacts with measures to increase 
ships’ survivability. The three basic areas of safety culture—(a) formal regulations and 
processes, (b) competence and training and (c) shared risk awareness throughout the 
organisation—were used to structure the analysis and results in Paper I. The first area, 
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formal regulations, was analysed for each case separately and the two other areas were 
analysed for the two cases together. 
Paper I, therefore, unveils the imbalance between traditional maritime safety and 
security and examines demands on the security risk management process in relation to 
a ship’s survivability. Paper I concludes that to be able to incorporate survivability and 
ship security into the understanding of the overall performance of a ship, a risk-
knowledge model, as one of several important measures of comparative effectiveness 
according to Figure 13, is needed. 
7.2 Paper II 
In Paper II, a probabilistic approach is used to investigate and describe how, based on 
a probabilistic risk assessment procedure, the concept of a ship’s operation can be 
transformed into relevant safety scenarios. The scenarios should be possible to use in 
evaluating consequences and probabilities as a decision support tool in the design of 
naval ships. 
Aspects of safety culture, codes, regulations and rules are analysed in terms of the 
requirements of safety scenarios. The analysis focuses on requirements, which ensure 
that the result can be used to improve the design process and to enhance design 
decision making. Military operational research, specifically related to modelling 
military systems, is described to ensure that safety scenarios effectively model military 
operations.  
Safety scenarios for commercial ships are often based on accident statistics combined 
with expert judgment but for military operations, statistical data is rare. The paper 
presents an example of a numerical simulation for event probability estimation. It 
demonstrates how probability-based scenarios can be derived. The objective of the 
model is to use the concept of operation to identify scenarios that relate to accident 
categories with major risk potential and to assess the probability of such scenarios. The 
model is a formalised procedure of incident quantification to support the definition of 
probability-based safety scenarios. The resulting scenarios can then be used in risk 
analysis. 
The inputs to the simulation model are typical design parameters, such as ship speed, 
sensor characteristics and intended fleet composition. Based on the concept of 
operation, the relevant types of naval operation are divided into tactical tasks defined 
with measures of effectiveness, environmental data and threat characteristics. These 
kinds of simulations are in their structure and model characteristics are not new, but 
the results must be aggregated and handled so that they are consistent with 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
The study shows that simulating tactical tasks makes it possible to quantify and analyse 
operation procedures and system configurations in relation to scenario probability. 
Simulation, therefore, supports scenario definition based on a combination of 
simulation output and expert judgment. The simulation will then illustrate the causal 
relationships that link the characteristics of the ship to the operational risks. For 
example, see Figure 14, which calculates the cumulative frequency of available time for 
counter measures for different situations. This will guide experts to more ship-specific 
probability functions than would have been the case if the experts had based safety 
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scenarios on experience alone. Therefore, the simulation can assist in a process that 
otherwise relied completely on expert judgment. 
 
Figure 14. Cumulative frequency of available time for counter measure. 1,000,000 simulated 
events. From the figure, it is clear that the combination of end of watch and waves combine to 
reduce the available time, and by how much. 
7.3 Paper III 
In Paper III, the ship security assessment of the ISPS code was reviewed from a 
broader perspective, making use of security research and experience from military 
force protection and methodological lessons learned from maritime probabilistic risk 
assessment. The study had two primary objectives: to explore the possibilities and 
conduct quantified and more thorough ship security risk analysis than that described in 
the ISPS code and its guidelines and to examine and evaluate the extent to which this 
more detailed analysis increases ship security. 
The study focused on Somali-based maritime piracy using piracy on the Indian Ocean 
as the sample scenario. Data were collected using questionnaires and interviews from 
civilian and military security experts with first-hand experience with piracy off the 
coast of Somalia. The data were specifically collected for this study and describe the 
threat capability, threat intent and the likelihood of exploiting the ships’ vulnerability. 
The data collection was performed in three different steps. In the first step, a 
questionnaire was sent to experts to collect data on piracy operating out of Somalia. 
The second step involved interviews with experts to collect a wider knowledge base on 
piracy and ship owners and operators’ risk management. In the third step, selected 
areas of piracy were revisited using a second questionnaire to decrease the range of the 
uncertainties in the answers. 
Event tree methodology was used to model and analyse both the possible 
consequences and the probabilities of an attack. The inductive event tree was used 
because a pirate attack has well-defined chronological steps illustrated by the 
sequences of the event tree. 
Collected data were used to develop models and calculate probabilities for the event 
tree. The calculations are simulations representing subsets of the scenario with 
influences according to influence diagrams. Throughout the analysis, the results of the 
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important role played by analysis in describing the interaction between pirates’ 
characteristics and ships’ vulnerability. Figures 15, 16 and 17 illustrate the three 
different areas and types of analysis performed: Monte Carlo simulations (Figure 15), 
analytic probability calculations (Figure 16), and calculating probability using influence 
diagrams (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 15. Quantitative output from the analysis in Paper III in the form of calculated 
probability of successful approach as a function of ship speed and skiff detection distance. 
 
Figure 16. Quantitative output from the analysis in Paper III in the form of calculated 
probability density functions for pirate-search groups on the Indian Ocean.  
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Figure 17. Influence diagram for assessing and comparing probability of successful boarding. 
According to the interviews conducted, the combination of graphical illustration and 
quantitative output not only calculates probabilities and consequences but also enables 
a qualitative discussion on causes and measures not possible solely on a qualitative 
analysis. In areas in which it is possible to compare the calculation results of the 
performed analysis with incident reports, the result of the study is inside the event 
space of the statistics and can therefore be assumed to model the relevant aspects of 
the threat, see for example Figure 15 (and also Figure 8). 
7.4 Paper IV 
The aim of Paper IV was to examine how risk control options related to survivability, 
redundancy and technical endurance can be linked to the operational risk in a patrol 
and surveillance scenario. The assessment is intended to support the ship-design 
decision-making process and to facilitate a balanced ship design that is well suited for 
the intended task. 
The study examined a generic OPV and used descriptions of ship design solutions such 
as damage stability and hull strength for survivability and redundancy. According to 
Figure 10 the ship operation, including the actions of the threat, was modelled using a 
influence diagram describing the scenario and dependency among different influences. 
The threat and ship were described with expert data collected from subject matter 
experts and include both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. The approach included 
an analysis of parameter uncertainty and uncertainty propagation using both Monte 
Carlo analysis and numerical derivative analysis. 
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The results show that it is possible to link the performance of specific ship design 
features to operational risk. The analysis also shows that dependency among different 
design features and influences is high such that it is important to implement a method 
that accommodates these dependencies. The ability to propagate epistemic 
uncertainties through the model is important to understand how uncertainty in the 
input affects the output. As seen in Figure 10, the output uncertainty for the studied 
scenario is small relative to the input uncertainty. The numerical derivative analysis 
effectively estimates the sensitivity of the output for each uncertain input parameter. 
Therefore, the study shows that linking different ship design features to aspects such as 
survivability, redundancy and technical endurance to the operational risk gives 
important information to the ship design decision-making process. 
Table 4 lists the ten highest 𝜕𝑦 𝜕𝑥𝑖⁄  for each examined output (target). As seen in 
Table 4, there each target is associated with a few variables that are of extra-high 
importance. In particular, for influence 18, the first three variables are all more than 
five times higher than the derivative for the fourth variable. However, the high effect 
variables (with high value for the derivative) are not the same for the three targets and 
are spread across the influence diagram. Only one variable, x1 defining the ship 
activity, is in the top ten for all three influences. 
Table 4. The ten variables with the highest effect on the output for each target, not considering 
the level of uncertainty for the variables.  
Rank Effect on crew (s17, state 1) Can float (s18, state 1) Can move (s19, state 1) 
(importance) Variable 𝜕𝑦 𝜕𝑥𝑖⁄   Variable 𝜕𝑦 𝜕𝑥𝑖⁄  Variable 𝜕𝑦 𝜕𝑥𝑖⁄  
1 x5.1 0.129 x55.1 0.272 x61.1 0.125 
2 x1.1 0.122 x57.1 0.136 x40.1 0.065 
3 x18.1 0.115 x59.1 0.108 x50.1 0.062 
4 x2.3 0.102 x35.4 0.020 x53.1 0.061 
5 x2.1 0.097 x35.1 0.012 x5.1 0.059 
6 x12.1 0.080 x56.1 0.010 x1.1 0.053 
7 x16.1 0.079 x35.2 0.009 x18.1 0.053 
8 x22.1 0.072 x10.4 0.007 x43.1 0.051 
9 x3.3 0.068 x34.4 0.007 x2.3 0.049 
10 x3.1 0.065 x1.2 0.006 x8.3 0.045 
It is also noteworthy that the variable with the second-highest uncertainty (variable x5, 
which describes the threat capability) is the variable with the highest effect on 
influence 17 and the fifth most important variable for influence 19. 
Given the high effect of x5 on influences 17 and 19 and the high uncertainty for x5, it is 
important to attempt to reduce the uncertainty of x5 because doing so will have a 
substantial effect on the uncertainty for influences 17 and 19. 
7.5 Paper V 
The purpose of Paper V was to describe and investigate the conditions for a risk-based 
approach to ship fire survivability that can serve as a link between probabilistic 
survivability theory and the selection of survivability measures. The aim was to suggest 
key aspects for a risk-based methodology. 
To aid in the analysis, the study proposes cause-and-effect models, as shown in Figure 
18, for the fire risk analysis and discusses the fire risk contribution from different 
ignition types. The analysis shows that the reliability and validity of identifying fire 
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scenarios depends on a qualitative and outward-focused analysis of the ship’s future 
and the reliability and validity of the analysis of fire-case consequences depends on the 
specific data and descriptions used. For example, the magnitude of the fire risk can 
drastically change as a result of operational choices (or unclear operational 
conditions). 
 
Figure 18. The proposed cause-and-effect model describes contributing factors to fire ignition, 
i.e. describes for example which design aspects affect the probability of a fire ignition. The 
model is used in Paper V to guide the analysis. 
The study concludes that the analysis must be based on an understanding of the 
operational conditions. Subsequently, civilian risk-based approaches for fire risk are 
too limited because the approaches do not capture either aspects or the intended 
operation of ship design. Moreover, normally military vulnerability tools lack this 
ability. However, based on a stringent fire-ignition analysis, including a definition of 
the intended operation, ship design concept and threat civilian methods and tools can 
be used to assess the consequences. 
Predictably, the risk contribution from fire onboard naval ships is high compared to 
allowable levels for civilian operations, especially for high-risk operations (Figure 12). 
This means that there are also societal reasons for working with fire risk on naval 
vessels, and Figure 12 shows that the focus should be on incidents with potentially high 
consequences. From Figure 12, it can also be seen that the greatest uncertainties 
(possible variation in risk) relate to the operator’s choices in terms of ship 
susceptibility and operation types. Therefore, even if a ship fulfils fire requirements, 
fire risk can be unnecessary high if the relationships among operation, design and risk 




“Risk is not a constant, measurable, concrete entity.” 
The International Association of Classification Societies’ words of caution 
in their A Guide to Risk Assessment in Ship Operations (IACS 2012). 
8 Discussion 
The aim of this thesis is to improve security decision support by defining an approach 
to ship security analysis. The approach should be systematic and should give the 
decision maker an appropriate picture of the risks. Thus, the overarching research 
question for this thesis is (from page 4) as follows: 
What characterises a decision-support approach that increases ship security by 
translating knowledge into a suitable description of the risks and promotes a 
conscious risk-taking? 
Papers I through V study ship operations with threats beyond the typical safety 
hazards. Such threats include a military threat to naval vessels (Papers I, II, IV and V) 
and the security threat posed by pirates to commercial vessels (Paper III). In such 
operations, the security threat must be considered when making decisions. 
In the previous sections, the performed work and the research questions are discussed 
from different perspectives. The aim of this section to join these to one more holistic 
perspective, i.e. the characteristics of the focused approach. 
When validating approach development focus must be on the usefulness of the 
approach in relation to purpose of the approach and if the usefulness can be linked to 
applying the method beyond the studied areas (Pedersen et al. 2000). Therefore, the 
performed studies examine six different application areas with the aim of investigating 
suitable characteristics of a risk-based approach in different ship security areas. 
Different aspects of ship security must be studied to make general statements on the 
usefulness of the approaches. If a more narrow research focus had been chosen in 
which only one area, such as piracy attacks on civilian ships or firing on naval vessels, 
had been studied, then it is likely that the results with respect to risk-analysis methods 
and tools could have been more concrete. However, it would not be possible, based on 
such research, to make general conclusions on an approach for risk-based ship security. 
To complement the primary discussion on the usefulness of the approach the appended 
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papers has also, where possible, validated the output against statistics. However, this is 
typically only possible for civilian scenarios or military operations under civilian 
conditions. 
In relation to quantitative validation, the results of Paper III and Paper V have been 
compared to available statistics and the level of risk accepted under civilian conditions 
respectively. The quantitative outputs have showed agreement with civilian statistics 
and the studied approach and models have been concluded to be able to explain 
central aspects of how the incidents lead to risk. However, the primary focus of Papers 
II-V has been to test and discuss the usefulness of the knowledge gained from the 
studies. Therefore, the conclusions made, in the appended papers and the thesis, focus 
on the usefulness (in risk management) of the qualitative aspects of the model output 
rather than on the quantitative output.  
Based on the results of Paper I and II, the thesis only discussed risk-based approaches. 
There is no obvious alternative security measure. In civilian shipping and military 
planning, risk is the dominating measure discussed. However, in military operational 
research and applied operational analysis, there are approaches that directly assess 
system reliability or operational effectiveness. i.e., which analyse the total effect (gain 
and risk) of the solution or system without explicitly assessing the risk. Such an analysis 
has not been explicitly studied in this thesis. To some extent, analysing reliability is 
based on the same probabilistic approaches as risk analysis and therefore, some results 
of this thesis could apply not only to reliability analysis but also to probabilistic analysis 
of operational effectiveness. 
The method and tool selection for this work has primarily been based on the central 
aspects of the approach and especially to choose tools that are well established in 
traditional maritime safety work and proven to support risk communication. 
Therefore, the transparency of the tools has been prioritized over mathematical 
effectiveness. Subsequently, the thesis includes no extensive literature study on 
potential methods and tools. Each of the appended papers however discuss the specific 
tool selection based the respective needs for that study. Many suitable methods and 
tools are therefore left untested and uncommented. 
It is found that neither safety nor security can be reduced only to the question of 
whether the ship fulfils safety and military survivability requirements. It is about 
securing core values such as lives and freedom of action. Therefore, the focus must be 
on whether the operational risk is acceptable. Consequently, operational risk must be 
assessed and communicated to decision makers and others involved within the design 
process and operation. The studies in this thesis have shown that a risk analysis that 
unambiguously can treat quantitative data has the following qualities: 
 It is an important tool for integrating safety and security and explicit risk 
acceptance levels. 
 It is possible to support with both quantitative data and system knowledge 
collected from experts, 
 It is crucial for understanding the causality of incidents, 
 It is fully compatible with the ambition to open and structurally work with both 
uncertainties and present uncertainties as part of the decision support, and 
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 It is possible to connect to military survivability theory and use in a military risk 
assessment to assist in survivability design. 
However, the study also shows that the reliability and validity of identifying security 
scenarios depends on a qualitative and outward-focused analysis of the ship’s future. 
The reliability and validity of the analysis of incident consequences depends on the 
specific data and descriptions of the ship used. Therefore, the analysis must be based 
on an understanding of the operational conditions. Subsequently, the civilian risk-
based approaches to risk analysis are not always applicable to naval ships because they 
does not include effects on the incident likelihood of the ship design or its intended 
operation. Furthermore, military vulnerability tools lack this ability. However, when 
incidents have been defined, civilian methods and tools can be used to assess the 
consequences if the ship specifications are suitable for naval ships. 
Moreover, the studies show that the security risk management is not straightforward 
and that existing guidelines are inadequate to guarantee a relevant outcome of the risk 
analysis. Successful application requires not only an understanding beyond today’s 
guidelines but also greater effort into the analysis than is typically done today. The 
quantitative perspective of the analysis is crucial, but without qualitative support, it is 
ineffective. The greatest challenges in the analysis are qualitative, e.g., how to capture 
qualitative aspects of the operation in the scenario and system definition. 
Summarising the results with respect to a security decision-support approach, it is 
therefore found that an approach should be characterised by the following 
requirement levels: 
Level 0, combining quantitative and qualitative aspects: Adhering to research, 
knowledge, methods and tools related to maritime safety are necessary but not 
sufficient to guarantee a suitable maritime security analysis. A security risk analysis 
requires a more rigorous scenario definition and knowledge collection. Identifying 
and defining scenarios must have a qualitative and outward-focused approach to the 
ship’s operational environment, whereas the analysis of risk levels requires a 
combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach focused on the ship itself as 
a socio-technological system. 
Level 1, specific and in line with the ship’s concept of operation: Generally, the 
approach, methods and tools for security risk analysis must be applied more 
specifically than for maritime safety. This is a result of the limited availability of 
statistics, dependence on operational specifications, epistemic uncertainty and the 
intent of the threat. Consequently, the analysis must be performed using methods 
that are more rigorous and on a more specific level. This also leads to the conclusion 
that the analysis must be performed by organisations that usually do not address 
other safety aspects (because traditionally, those aspects are managed on a more 
generic level). 
Level 2, recognising the effects of risk perception: The manner in which risk controls 
are chosen, implemented, explained and perceived (by one’s own organisation and 
threats) will affect the effectiveness of controls. The understanding of these effects is 
crucial but also poses a genuine uncertainty. 
 60 
The challenges presented by Levels 0 and 1 are possible to mitigate with a well-defined 
implementation of a ship security approach in an organisation. This is because a ship 
security risk analysis has been shown to explain how different protective measures lead 
to reduced risk. Therefore, the analysis supports conscious risk taking. However, the 
genuine uncertainty as a result of risk perception can never be resolved but instead, 
must be recognised and should never be hidden by the approach chosen. Level 2 also 
imposes requirements in terms of openness (within the organisation) about activities 
within Levels 0 and 1, an openness that contradicts the traditional, secretive approach 
to security. 
It is important to note that the approach proposed here strives to explain and compare 
future risks. This knowledge can be used in many different ways both before and after 
design decisions are made. For example, using risk as a measure of security does not 
contradict a resilient perspective. Resilience is a question of how security is achieved, 
not how it is measured. Another similar example is robustness, in which the risk in 
different possible futures, or surprises, must be assessed and compared. However, both 
resilience and robustness require a risk description that includes uncertainties. 
Uncertainties are needed because parts of the decisions must be based on different risk 
uncertainty ranges of the alternatives, not only on the respective expected risk levels. 
Based on such information, it is then up to the decision-maker to decide how to use the 
risk knowledge. Therefore, risk is not a fully measurable and concrete entity, but it can 
be a useful measure for presenting and communicating important and possibly 
dangerous aspects of operations. 
Specifically for the three examples in Section 1.2 the proposed approach and findings 
lead to that, an increased shared risk understanding is needed, specifically regarding 
the scope and applicability of the organization’s risk management. Such understanding 
can then reduce frustrating disagreement and sometimes avoid severe consequences. 
The crew choosing to stop because of shots from pirates could probably have been 
avoided if the crew had been more involved in the risk management. The result from a 
study as the one exemplified in Paper III shows how effective speed is as a piracy 
protection. In the example with the IED attack on a Swedish military vehicle in 
Afghanistan especially an understanding of the importance of communicating and 
agreeing on the relevant consequences and scenarios to study would have reduced the 
difference in understanding in relation to threats, vulnerabilities and risks (Section 
5.3.1). This would probably have made the organisation more effective, but would not 
necessarily have changed the outcome of the incident. Paper IV show that the 
organization around President Obama should have a common approach for discussing 
uncertainties as an aspect of the threat understanding, as such uncertainties cannot be 
avoided. 
How to define and use risk criteria is not included in this study. However, it is clear 
from the work that implicit security risk criteria are important for risk management. 
Sometimes, general safety criteria can be used, but especially for military risk 
management, they are not sufficient. In many military situations, the operational risks 
are central, and risk-management decisions cannot be based on, e.g., an FN diagram. 
The criteria must also include a view of allowable uncertainties. Another challenge 
related to risk criteria is that different risk criteria generate different decisions. One 
design alternative may give the lowest short-term expected fatalities, another gives the 
lowest operational risk and a third gives the lowest long-term expected fatalities. 
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Finally, it is also important to acknowledge that using security risk-knowledge models 
in ship design and military planning also imposes new challenges and demands on 










The aim of this thesis is to improve security decision support by defining what 
characterises a decision-support approach that translates knowledge into a suitable 
description of the risks. 
The approach, as well as methods and tools, are selected as a result of the focus on risk 
understanding. This thesis finds that a well-designed risk-based approach brings the 
procedure and results of ship security analysis into the open and therefore enables 
criticism, improvements and shared risk knowledge, which are not possible with less-
structured methods. Risk is not a fully measurable and concrete entity, but it can be a 
useful tool for presenting and communicating important and possibly dangerous 
aspects of operations. The risk-based approach, therefore, enables a discussion about 
probabilities and facilitates feedback to experts on their assessments, which will lead to 
better assessments in the future. The characteristics of a risk-based ship security 
approach described below are relevant both as a scientific contribution and in relation 
to security risk management in military and civilian organisations. 
In conclusion, the methods and tools developed for safety risk analysis also are 
generally valid for security risk analysis, but not without specific considerations. A 
security risk analysis requires a more rigorous scenario definition and knowledge 
collection. The process for identifying and defining scenarios must have a qualitative 
and outward-focused approach of the ship’s operational environment, whereas an 
analysis of risk levels requires a combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach 
focused on the ship itself as a socio-technological system. 
Relevant historical information is often limited and expert judgment is needed to 
define scenarios. Expert judgement can collect a qualitative understanding of 
important aspects of the studied socio-technological system, but also introduces 
uncertainties. 
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When analysing the threat and defining the scenario there must be a focus on the 
threat’s modus operandi, how it can lead to damage to the ship and whether the 
intended ship tasks limit the number of relevant modus operandi. In addition, it is 
important to question how the likelihood of different attack modus operandi is 
affected by ship tasks and ship susceptibility. The scenario must be developed for 
specific ship concepts and concept of operation and a change in a ship or operation 
concept can change the probability of threat encounters and/or the effects of an attack. 
A successful analysis that correctly compares military survivability between alternative 
designs must at least include and focus on the relationship between design choices and 
the probability of incidents, such as the following: a hit; the state of the ship at the time 
of incident (which varies for the same scenario among concepts due to differences in 
ship tactics, ship susceptibility and ship vulnerability); complicated incidents with 
potentially severe consequences; qualitative safety culture and human factor aspects; 
and models and data suitable for the ship in question. 
It is also concluded that that the approach should be quantitative to facilitate the 
structured use of measurable aspects (data) in the analysis, which reduces the aspects 
that must be analysed: the definition and analysis of uncertainties; critical and objective 
examination of the analysis; knowledge transfer to fleet management, on-board tactics 
and crew training; and an update of the analysis if more data is acquired or more 
knowledge about the system is gained. In particular, as the security of a system relies 
on system robustness, the uncertainty treatment and uncertainty communication 
offered by the quantitative approach is central. Without this understanding of how 
input and model uncertainty affects risk estimates, the robustness of different 
alternatives cannot be discussed. This study also shows that ignoring known 
uncertainties, by, e.g., basing a risk analysis on expected values, can result in erroneous 
risk values. Therefore, the risk analysis should be seen as part of an operations 
knowledge system and the quantitative aspects guarantee unambiguous transfer of 
knowledge. 
Challenges concerning selection of method and tools and knowledge collection 
(defined as Levels 0 and 1 in Section 8) can be dealt with, at least in theory, by a well-
defined implementation of a ship-security approach in an organisation. This because a 
ship security risk-analysis has been shown to be able to explain how different 
protective measures lead to risk reduction. Therefore, the analysis supports conscious 
risk taking. However, the result of the genuine uncertainty caused by risk perception 
can never be resolved, but must be recognised and should never be hidden by the 
approach chosen. The need for a shared risk picture also imposes requirements in 
terms of openness (within the organisation) on risk-management activities, an 
openness that contradicts the traditionally secretive approach to security.  
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“It is hoped that cross-disciplinary analysis of the perception and impact of 
the security-risk will stimulate thinking on appropriate tools and analytical 
frameworks for enhancing port and maritime security. In so doing, it may be 
possible to develop new approaches to security assessment and 
management.” 
K. Bichou at the Centre for Transport studies, Imperial College London, 
in the Conclusions to Security and risk-based models in shipping and ports. 
Review and critical analysis (Bichou 2008). 
10 Future work 
Many institutions worldwide have spent several years on maritime safety research; the 
area of maritime security is much less mature. Subsequently, the understanding of how 
threats lead to security risks is still limited and there is an urgent need for future work. 
Based on the current results, the aim in coming years is to deepen the analysis 
completed, to be able to verify the results and to validate the proposed approach more 
thoroughly. 
Despite a lack of historical data and difficulties in performing realistic experiments, 
future studies must be performed to further verify the calculations of both probabilities 
and consequences and to further validate the results of the risk analysis. Three 
different principal approaches to such a verification and validation are briefly 
discussed below. 
Theoretical method development 
Due to the immaturity of the field and the limited availability of data, future work 
must include theoretical method development. To cover all aspects of risk analysis, the 
work is to be divided into several small areas and for each of these areas, the results 
are to be both verified and validated on simplified base cases for which data is either 
available or obtainable. 
Focus areas for theoretical method development could include, but not be limited to, 
the following: 
 tools for developing and validating probability-based security scenarios,  
 reliability and calibration of expert assessment for ship-security analysis, 
 theoretical and methodical studies on the concept of robustness, including how 
robustness can be described, analysed and implemented in relation to security 
and military survivability, 
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 development of ship-security simulations and verification methods, and 
 how and to what extent the proposed methods and tools can be utilised in 
analysing reliability (rather than risk). 
Such studies would be able to give specific recommendations on how ship risk analysis 
should be planned, performed and used on ships. 
Applied method development on naval ships 
For naval ships, the connection between security risks and the concept of ship 
operation is particularly strong. This places the focus on the validity of the risk analysis 
in relation to the ship’s measures of effectiveness. Without such validity, the risk 
analysis is pointless. Therefore, studies of naval ships are important for establishing an 
understanding of the utility of security risk analysis. 
Studies of naval ships could give unique insight into the following issues: 
 how a safety culture of calculated risk taking can be represented in risk analysis, 
and 
 how, and to what extent, the analysis should be performed to make the analysis 
useful. 
The studies can be performed on specific survivability aspects, such as fire risk, and 
connect those results to the ships’ operational performance. However, to correctly 
capture the operational performance, the research most likely should include war 
games and on-board experiments. 
Applied method development on civilian ships 
Ship-specific analyses are important because the detail of such studies will introduce 
problems not encountered in the more general studies performed so far. For civilian 
ships, there are statistics and incident reports available to study and based on the 
experience from Paper III, it can be assumed that for limited scenarios, it is possible to 
perform a detailed security analysis and also to verify and validate the result. Studies 
could be performed on the following subjects: 
 projects and incidents (such as case studies), in which the traditional safety 
perspective is challenged by novel or specific security considerations, 
 the decision process itself in relation to risk-based analysis and risk perception, 
human factors and uncertainties, 
 piracy in different regions, and testing how accurately the model can describe 
how the risk is affected by the threats intent and modus operandi, 
 the ship and port interaction, and 
 terrorist attacks and examining how conceptually different intent (terror) changes 
the conditions for analysis. 
Research on civilian ships also would allow the study of which results should be 
presented and how they should be presented for risk evaluation and risk reduction to 
create effective risk management.  
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